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67 
ROLES FOR STATE ENERGY 
REGULATORS IN CLIMATE 
CHANGE MITIGATION 
Brandon Hofmeister* 
The construction of new power plants in the United States carries the risk of 
significantly contributing to global climate change. After concluding that the cur-
rent federal regulatory response to climate change risks from power plants is 
inadequate, this Article examines three potential roles for state energy regulators 
to play as a bridge climate mitigation strategy until a cohesive federal policy is 
enacted. State energy regulators have received relatively little attention as poten-
tial climate change regulators, but they are well positioned to analyze and 
mitigate climate change risks from new power plants. The Article considers the 
advantages and drawbacks of state energy regulators considering greenhouse gas 
risks in traditional utility regulatory proceedings. It describes an innovative strat-
egy used by the State of Michigan to incorporate state energy regulators into state 
environmental permitting proceedings. Finally, the Article considers a more dra-
matic proposal to merge energy and environmental considerations into a single 
power plant siting regulatory process where state energy regulators affirmatively 
decide what type of power plant to build and use a competitive bidding process to 
select a private owner of the plant.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The decision to build a new electric generating plant has enormous 
significance. Modern power plants often cost billions of dollars to construct 
and remain in operation for decades. In the United States, investing in a 
new generating facility is a decision traditionally made by private, monopo-
lized utilities that are regulated both by state economic regulators 
implementing state law and state environmental agencies implementing 
federal law.1 No single regulator squarely confronts the fundamental ques-
tion of how to balance the trade-offs between environmental burdens and 
inexpensive energy supply goals.2 As a result, the regulatory process for 
                                                                                                                      
 1. Lincoln Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 491 (2010); see also Amy Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of 
Energy Law and Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2011). 
 2. Environmental regulators seek to mitigate the impact on the environment from 
electricity generation. This often has the effect of increasing costs of electricity production 
to promote environmental benefits. The upward pressure on costs contrasts with the tradi-
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approving new power plants is fractured, inefficient, and incomplete in its 
analysis of all of the relevant considerations.3 This system has been chang-
ing over the past few decades, but is still largely intact.4  
Power plants have a number of environmental impacts, but they are 
particularly large emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs) that contribute to 
global climate change.5 The risk of global climate change poses an excep-
tionally difficult challenge for the U.S. system of energy and environmental 
regulation.6 In addition, the longer governments wait to act, the more diffi-
                                                                                                                      
tional goals of economic regulators of monopoly public utilities. Economic regulators have 
been concerned primarily with ensuring reliable supply of electricity while protecting 
consumers from unwarranted rate increases. Davies, supra note 1, at 494–95.  
 3. See id. at 500. See generally Peter Huber, Electricity and the Environment: In Search 
of Regulatory Authority, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1987); James T. Marsh & James P. Ramey 
Jr., Delays and Bottlenecks in the Licensing Process Affecting Utilities: The Role of Improved Proce-
dures and Advanced Planning, 1970 DUKE L. J. 25 (1970); Irving R. Kaufman, Power for the 
People—and by the People: Utilities, the Environment and the Public Interest, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
867 (1971). 
 4. Economic regulators are playing a reduced role in electricity generation decisions 
as the United States has moved toward a system of wholesale electricity competition. The 
need for traditional economic regulation of electricity generation decisions has been called 
into serious question in recent years. Indeed, many believe that electricity generation, unlike 
the electricity transmission and distribution, is not a natural monopoly that warrants tradi-
tional economic regulation. David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory 
vs. Practice, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 418–23 (2005).  
 5. Electricity generation accounts for approximately 39% of total U.S. carbon diox-
ide emissions and 7% of total world carbon dioxide emissions. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2009, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 5–6 (2011), available at http://epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/ 
US-GHG-Inventory-2011-Executive-Summary.pdf (estimating total U.S. carbon dioxide 
emissions from electricity generation as 2.15 billion tons out of a total 5.51 billion tons of 
U.S. carbon dioxide emissions in 2009); INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, CO2 EMISSIONS FROM 
FUEL COMBUSTION HIGHLIGHTS 46, 58 (2011), available at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights.pdf 
(estimating total world carbon dioxide emissions of approximately 29 billion tons in 2009). 
 6. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Re-
straining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009). Though the 
merits of climate change science continue to be debated by some politicians and popular 
media figures, the evidence developed by climate scientists collected over the past few 
decades has left little doubt that the threat of climate change is real and that man’s actions 
are contributing to it. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_ 
report_wg1_report_the_physical_science_basis.htm. Scientific uncertainty regarding the 
precise impacts of a warming earth, as well as the economic impacts of both climate change 
and actions to mitigate climate change, remains. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 72–73 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC 
SYNTHESIS REPORT], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ 
ar4_syr.pdf. But there is at least some risk of global catastrophe, and the remaining  
uncertainties have yielded a legitimate debate about what scale of response to mitigate the 
risk of climate change is appropriate. 
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cult and expensive it becomes to achieve mitigation.7 Meanwhile, there is a 
need for investment in new electric generating plants over the next decade.8  
Given the scale of the problem and the ineffectiveness of solutions to 
date, some commentators have advocated an “all hands on deck” strategy of 
climate change mitigation.9 If the first choice of policy mechanisms—an 
international, economy-wide price on carbon—seems unlikely to be enact-
ed, pragmatic risk management dictates that policymakers should make the 
best of existing regulatory structures or utilize flawed, but still compara-
tively helpful, policies. In the long-term, it could turn out that realistic, 
pragmatic, cost-effective steps to mitigate climate change may be more 
likely to come not by instituting a geopolitically challenging international 
top-down price on carbon, but by incorporating thoughtful climate change 
mitigation strategies into existing regulatory structures.10 Climate change 
mitigation may also be better achieved (or more politically feasible) 
through a sector-specific approach, rather than economy-wide regulation.11 
State governments can serve important stopgap roles when the federal 
government inadequately addresses a problem. Much legal scholarship has 
been written about state leadership in GHG mitigation generally,12 but 
relatively little has focused on the potential role of state utility regulators in 
mitigating climate risks. In the face of inadequate international and federal 
regulation of GHGs, this Article analyzes three potential roles that state 
energy regulators may be able to play to mitigate climate change risk from 
new power plants. First, state energy regulators could consider using envi-
ronmental “adders” to project GHG externality costs in the traditional 
proceedings that approve new investments in electricity supply. Second, 
energy regulators could perform a similar analytical role in a different legal 
context by assisting state environmental regulators in Clean Air Act (CAA) 
permitting. Finally, a state could dramatically shift the responsibility for 
choosing an electric generation technology from private actors seeking 
                                                                                                                      
 7. See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 1160. 
 8. See infra text accompanying note 14. 
 9. See, e.g., Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the 
Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 677 (2010). 
 10. See, e.g., William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global 
Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457 
(2010) (analyzing the shortcomings of one-size-fits-all policy mechanism in the context of 
one climate related “sector”—international forest management). 
 11. See, e.g., The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, 
Dec. 3–15, 2007, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its 13th Sess., 4, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/ 
cop13/eng/06a01.pdf (noting that nations negotiating an international climate change treaty 
will consider “sector-specific approaches” to mitigating climate change).  
 12. See, e.g. Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What is Motivat-
ing State and Local Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About 
Federalism and Environmental Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015 (2006). 
Hofmeister_Final_WEB 1/22/2013 1:51 PM 
Fall 2012] Roles for State Energy Regulators in Climate Change Mitigation 71 
government approval to state energy regulators. Once regulators have de-
cided on the type of power plant to be built, a competitive bidding process 
could be employed to provide private ownership of the facility in a manner 
that is least costly for ratepayers. 
State energy regulators can effectively address the environmental risks 
from climate change and the financial risks associated with complying with 
future national or international climate change regulatory regimes. While 
state energy regulators have not traditionally analyzed environmental im-
pacts in their regulatory proceedings, GHG emissions are a problem well-
suited to their expertise. The costs imposed by GHGs are best addressed by 
considering a range of projected global externality costs. Unlike more tradi-
tional environmental considerations, these analyses do not require specific 
toxicology reports regarding a pollutant’s public health impact in a specific 
area. Rather, analyzing GHG risks is more akin to a pure financial cost 
analysis. Analyzing whether it is prudent to build a new power plant and 
which type of power plant should be built is a task utility regulators are 
likely better suited to perform than environmental regulators.  
For energy regulators, mitigating climate risk may also be seen as an 
outgrowth of their goal to reduce future financial risk to ratepayers. If and 
when a national or international climate regulatory regime is enacted, it will 
likely have huge compliance costs for utilities that have not taken prudent 
steps to mitigate their GHG emissions. But from an institutional design 
perspective, state utility regulators may be able to do more than protect 
customers from anticipated future costs. Energy regulators have skill sets 
and expert staffs that enable them to engage in the critical analysis regard-
ing which types of new generating capacity best balance the different goals 
of achieving reliability and environmental sustainability at a low cost to 
customers. Energy regulators in many states have traditionally left envi-
ronmental tradeoffs to other policymakers, so this would be an expanded 
role for some energy regulators. It may nonetheless be warranted.  
The potential roles for energy regulators discussed in this Article have 
drawbacks, even deep flaws.13 But policymakers must be pragmatic in 
choosing policy solutions to mitigate climate risk. They cannot become so 
enamored with a single potential solution—whether it is cap-and-trade or a 
carbon tax—that they dismiss any other less comprehensive or efficient 
solutions. Policymakers should recognize and understand a policy’s short-
                                                                                                                      
 13. There is no perfect solution to climate change. A carbon tax is itself imperfect. 
Determining the proper amount of the tax by estimating the average social cost of climate 
change risk per unit of GHG is an incredibly difficult quantitative task. See infra text ac-
companying notes 68–80. A GHG cap-and-trade regime is imperfect. Setting the proper 
level of emissions to be capped (particularly in a politicized process) involves another ex-
ceedingly difficult quantitative estimation of risks and costs. Measuring and enforcing the 
cap across a number of sectors is likewise extraordinarily difficult.  
Hofmeister_Final_WEB 1/22/2013 1:51 PM 
72 Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law [Vol. 2:1 
comings, but nonetheless consider implementing it over the riskier adher-
ence to the status quo.  
I. THE NEED FOR STATE REGULATORY RESPONSES 
A. The Need for New Electric Generating Capacity 
The U.S. electricity infrastructure is aging. The electricity industry 
will need to invest in new replacement generation capacity over the next 
decade as obsolete power plants are retired.14 This need is being accelerated 
by new environmental regulations on existing generation.15 Compliance 
with these new rules will be difficult and likely cost-prohibitive for many 
older coal-fired power plants in particular. Utility giant American Electric 
Power recently predicted that pending EPA regulations would force it to 
shutter 25% of its coal fleet.16 These forthcoming regulations will likely 
drive significant retirements in the existing U.S. coal plant fleet.17  
                                                                                                                      
 14. The expected life of most large fossil fuel power plants is 40 years. See JEFFREY 
FANG & PAUL GALEN, ISSUES AND METHODS IN INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXTERNALITIES INTO THE INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING PROCESS 5 (Nat’l Renewable 
Energy Lab. Report No. NREL/TP-461-6684, Nov. 1994) available at http://www.nrel.gov/ 
docs/legosti/old/6684.pdf. And at the end of 2010, just over one-half of all U.S. electric 
generating capacity was over 30 years old, with approximately one-quarter over 40 years old. 
Age of Electric Power Generators Varies Widely, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 16, 2011), 
http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=1830. While some of these facilities may be 
utilized beyond their expected useful life, a number of aging power plants across the United 
States are likely to be retired in the next decade. 
 15. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coal- 
and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for 
Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industri-
al-Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,976 (May 3, 2011) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63); Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; 
Identification and Listing of Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals From 
Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,128 (June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 
261, 264, 265, 268, 271, 302); National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—Cooling 
Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and Phase I Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,174 
(Apr. 20, 2011). The D.C. Circuit recently struck down another EPA regulation dealing with 
air pollution that crosses state borders, but left an earlier version of the rule in place while 
EPA promulgates a new rule. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
No. 11-1302, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 17535 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 2012).  
 16. Gabriel Nelson, AEP Predicts Need to Shutter 25% of Coal Fleet, E&ENEWS PM 
(June 9, 2011), http://www.eenews.net/public/eenewspm/2011/06/09/3. 
 17. The U.S. Energy Information Administration recently estimated that nearly 49 
gigawatts of coal-fired generating capacity will be retired in the next 10 years, driven in part 
by the new EPA regulations. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL 
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 at 4, 45 (2012) [hereinafter ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012], 
available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2012).pdf. The existing U.S. coal 
fleet is 308 gigawatts. Id. at 150.  
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At the same time, despite huge opportunities to reduce U.S. electricity 
demand via energy efficiency,18 there is still likely to be increased electricity 
demand as the U.S. economy grows.19 Accordingly, over the next decade, 
utilities around the United States will need to invest in electric generating 
capacity, primarily to replace aging and obsolete plants.  
B. The Inadequacy of Existing Federal Greenhouse Gas Regulations  
1. Failure to Enact an Economy-Wide “Price on Carbon” 
There is a consensus among many academics that the most efficient 
and effective government policy to address the risks of climate change 
would be a national, or international, “carbon price.”20 Environmental regu-
lation designed to incorporate the full social costs of electricity generation 
into price could theoretically reach a socially efficient outcome in a compet-
itive electricity market.21 Accordingly, one potentially rational system for 
choosing new electricity generation would be to do away with economic 
regulation of electricity generation and instead use competitive wholesale 
markets. However, it seems unlikely that the United States will adopt  
either a national system of wholesale electricity competition or an effective 
price on carbon in the near future.22  
                                                                                                                      
 18. Brandon Hofmeister, Bridging the Gap: Using Social Psychology to Design Market 
Interventions to Overcome the Energy Efficiency Gap in Residential Energy Markets, 19 
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2010). 
 19. The Energy Information Administration’s 2012 Annual Energy Outlook predicts 
that total U.S. electricity supply will grow by approximately 3% through 2020, adding 72.5 
gigawatts of new generating capacity. ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 17, at 47, 
148, 150.  
 20. A carbon price could be implemented either through a cap-and-trade system of 
pollution allowances or a tax on GHG emissions. See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus, After Kyoto: 
Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming, 96 AM. ECON. REV., May 2006, at 31, 31–
34; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Energy Independence and Global Warming, 37 ENVTL. L. 595, 600–02 
(2007); Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap and Trade System to Address Climate Change, 
32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293 (2008); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combat-
ing Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap 
and Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009). 
 21. Cf. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499, 500–03 (1961). 
 22. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the Elec-
tricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451 (2005); John Broder, ‘Cap and Trade’ Loses Its 
Standing as Energy Policy of Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A13. 
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2. Inadequacy of GHG Regulation Under the Clean Air Act
The EPA, spurred on by the landmark 2007 Supreme Court decision in 
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency,23 has recently begun to 
implement GHG regulations under the existing CAA for major sources of 
emissions like power plants.24 However, the viability of these regulations—
both legally and politically—is currently at risk.  
Under the CAA, stationary sources of pollutants must implement the 
“best available control technology” (BACT) for each pollutant before the 
construction or major modification of any “major emitting facility” that has 
the “potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any 
air pollutant.”25 This 250 ton threshold is a significant limitation on the 
scope of facilities subject to permitting requirements for the pollutants 
traditionally regulated under the CAA, such as sulfur dioxide or nitrous 
oxides.26 GHGs are generally emitted in much greater quantities than the 
other air pollutants regulated by the BACT requirement, however, leading 
to many additional facilities falling within the scope of BACT require-
ments.27 
The CAA also includes another permitting requirement for existing 
stationary sources of air pollution known as Title V operating permits.28 
This program applies to sources that have the potential to emit 100 tons per 
                                                                                                                      
 23. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (holding that 
GHGs are “air pollutants” under the CAA). This landmark decision set forth a chain reac-
tion of events that eventually led to the EPA regulating GHG emissions from stationary 
sources like power plants under the CAA. See generally Jonathan Adler, Heat Expands All 
Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Obama Administration, 34 
HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 421, 426–38 (2011) [hereinafter Adler, Heat Expands]. 
 24. E.g., Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailor-
ing Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) [hereinafter Tailoring Rule]; Standards of 
Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed GHG 
NSPS Rule]. 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2006). The definition also 
includes a lower threshold of 100 tons per year of any air pollutant for certain expressly 
listed facilities. 
 26. Prior to the GHG BACT requirement, approximately 800 permits with the 
BACT requirement for new or modified sources of air pollution were issued under the CAA 
each year. Tailoring Rule, supra note 24, at 31,537. 
 27. The EPA estimated that if the CAA were applied to GHG BACT determina-
tions, over 84,000 sources would require permits for new construction or major 
modifications annually. Id. at 31,540. 
 28. A Title V operating permit centralizes all of the CAA’s various substantive re-
quirements for each source into one permit, but does not add any additional substantive 
pollution reduction requirements for applicants. Id. at 31,521. The permit does require major 
sources of air pollution to keep and report records of emissions and to pay an administrative 
fee. Id. 
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year of any pollutant subject to regulation.29 The EPA estimated that if the 
100 ton threshold for Title V permits went into effect for GHG emissions, 
the number of existing regulated sources of air pollution would go from 
15,000 to over 6 million sources.30 
Processing millions of GHG permits would add enormous costs for 
both private industry and government regulators.31 Consequently, the EPA 
issued a final rule that narrowly tailors the BACT and Title V permit re-
quirements so that they apply to far fewer sources than the text of the CAA 
provides.32 To justify this tailoring despite the clear statutory text, the EPA 
has relied upon three different statutory interpretation rationales—the 
doctrine of “absurd results,” and what the EPA calls the “administrative 
necessity” and “one-step-at-a-time” doctrines.33 The EPA argues that fideli-
ty to the specific text of the CAA would result in such a large number of 
small sources being subject to such high compliance costs that it would 
contradict Congress’ actual intent.34  
The EPA is walking a statutory interpretation tightrope with this rule. 
It is arguing that Congress could not possibly have intended the CAA to 
regulate small sources of GHGs, but that the CAA provides that large 
sources of GHGs must be regulated. Regardless of actual legislative intent 
or policy arguments about implementation, courts might seek fidelity to the 
explicit text.35 Such a strict textual reading could result in striking down the 
tailoring rule as inconsistent with the statutory text. 
However, it is hard to imagine that a reviewing court would read the 
Act to require the EPA to regulate millions of small sources of GHGs 
given the practical consequences of such a decision.36 If a court did some-
                                                                                                                      
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2006) (referencing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j)). 
 30. Tailoring Rule, supra note 24, at 31,540. 
 31. The EPA estimated that the additional administrative cost for government regula-
tors alone would be $22.5 billion per year, a 300-fold increase over the current 
administrative costs of approximately $74 million per year. Id. at 31,540. 
 32. The rule applies the BACT and Title V requirements to facilities that either 
already must comply with these permitting requirements for other pollutants or facilities 
that emit more than 100,000 tons of GHGs annually. Id. at 31,516.  
 33. Id. at 31,541.  
 34. Id.  
 35. The analysis used in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–32 (2007), bolsters 
the EPA’s argument that GHGs must be regulated under the CAA. The Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected the argument that Congress did not actually intend for the Act to regulate 
GHGs, relying instead on the unambiguous text of the CAA. Id. at 528–32. This fidelity to 
the explicit text of the statute—despite good arguments that members of Congress did not, 
in fact, actually intend for GHGs to be regulated under the CAA and that regulation would 
lead to administrative difficulties—suggests that the future interpretations of CAA’s authori-
ty regarding GHGs should be made similarly. 
 36. Indeed, no one seems to be arguing for that result. Even the environmental group 
challenging the EPA’s tailoring rule as too lax is not arguing that the CAA requires small 
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how reach that result, there would be tremendous political pressure on 
Congress to amend the CAA to remove this regulatory burden.  
The EPA’s interpretation was challenged by a number of states, non-
profit associations, and corporations, but in June of 2012, the Federal Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held these plaintiffs lacked stand-
ing to challenge the rule.37 The D.C. Circuit’s decision prolongs the legal 
uncertainty surrounding the EPA’s GHG rules for stationary sources.  
In addition to the BACT requirement, the CAA also requires “perfor-
mance standards” for “new sources” of air pollutants.38 These new source 
performance standards (NSPS) have traditionally been promulgated as 
minimum technological standards applying to specific, newly installed 
sources of emissions, such as new coal-fired power plants.39 Pursuant to a 
settlement agreement, the EPA issued proposed NSPS for GHGs from 
power plants in the spring of 2012.40 The proposed rule requires new coal-
fired or natural gas-fired plants to achieve a GHG emission rate achievable 
by a modern natural gas unit.41 The Proposed GHG NSPS Rule has come 
                                                                                                                      
sources of GHGs to be regulated. Robin Bravender, Enviro Group Sues EPA Over Greenhouse 
Gas “Tailoring” Rule, N.Y. TIMES GREENWIRE (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
gwire/2010/08/02/02greenwire-enviro-group-sues-epa-over-greenhouse-gas-tail-49225.html. 
A reviewing court might, for example, distinguish the statutory definition of “air pollutant” 
from the statutory definition of “major emitting source” in terms of how closely the explicit 
text must be followed, relying in part on the dire consequences painted by the EPA. The 
latter may truly be absurd, while the former was merely unanticipated. But it is hard to 
predict what circumstances may cause a court to disregard the unambiguous text of a statute, 
particularly in an era of the revival of textualism in the federal judiciary. JOHN MANNING & 
MATTHEW STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 49 (2010). 
 37. Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 09-1322 
slip op. at 81 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 2012). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).  
 39. See generally Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources, 40 C.F.R. pt. 
60 (2011). 
 40. Proposed GHG NSPS Rule, supra note 24; Jean Chemnick, EPA Seen Likely to 
Miss Deadline on Rule for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Utilities, N.Y. TIMES GREENWIRE 
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/09/14/14greenwire-epa-seen-likely-to-miss-
deadline-on-rule-for-g-41611.html. 
 41. Any new electric generating units that use steam turbines and combined cycle 
technologies would be required to emit less than 1,000 pounds of carbon dioxide equivalent 
per megawatt-hour of electricity generated. Proposed GHG NSPS Rule, supra note 24, at 
22,394. If this rule is finalized in its current form, it would make it very unlikely for new 
coal plants to be constructed in the United States unless they utilize carbon capture and 
sequestration technology. Because carbon capture and sequestration technology is not yet 
commercially viable, the rule would effectively ban new coal plants using current technology 
in the United States. The proposed rule does contain a novel 30-year compliance option 
whereby traditional coal plants could operate without carbon capture and sequestration 
technology for a 10-year period, and then incorporate carbon capture and sequestration for a 
twenty year period in such a way that the average emissions over thirty years meets the 1000 
ton standard. Id. 
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under significant political attack by business groups and will undoubtedly 
face legal challenge if finalized.42  
The EPA’s GHG regulatory actions may also change for political rea-
sons. There already exists a significant sentiment in Congress to revoke the 
EPA’s authority to implement this program either permanently or tempo-
rarily.43 Congressional Republicans have also been attempting to restrict 
the EPA’s GHG regulatory powers by inserting restrictive provisions in 
appropriations legislation.44 The reelection of President Obama makes 
outright repeal of the EPA’s authority less likely. However, it is difficult to 
forecast whether Congress or the Administration will make changes to the 
EPA’s GHG regulatory authority in the near future, and even less certain 
what will happen after President Obama leaves office. 
In addition to BACT, Title V, and NSPS, the CAA may also require 
the EPA to promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) for GHGs.45 NAAQS are designed to keep the levels of certain 
criteria air pollutants in the outside air below standards designed to meet 
health and welfare goals.46 If a NAAQS is promulgated, states are then 
                                                                                                                      
 42. The President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has called the rule “legally 
dubious.” Jean Chemnick, Chamber President Slams EPA’s ‘Legally Dubious’ Greenhouse Gas 
Rule, ENV’T & ENERGY DAILY (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/eed/ (available by 
subscription). One possible legal challenge is that the combination of combined cycle plants 
with traditional steam plants in the same standard violates the CAA. Former EPA Air Chief 
Holmstead Discusses Challenges to NSPS Rule, E&E TV (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/ 
tv/2012/04/02/. In its proposed rule, EPA argues that the text of the CAA provides the 
Administrator the ability to publish a list of sources and broadly to “revise” that list, which 
EPA argues it is doing by combining two previously separate sources into one category. 
Proposed GHG NSPS Rule, supra note 24, at 22,398 (citing CAA § 111(b)(1)(A)). 
 43. The House of Representative passed a bill completely repealing the EPA’s author-
ity to regulate GHGs under the CAA on April 7, 2011 by a vote of 255–172. Robin 
Bravender, House Votes to Kill EPA Climate Regulations, POLITICO (Apr. 7, 2011, 3:39 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/52759.html. On April 6, 2011, the Senate voted 
on a number of different proposals to restrict the EPA’s GHG regulatory authority. While 
none received the sixty votes necessary to overcome a filibuster, seventeen Senate Demo-
crats voted in favor of some form of restriction on EPA’s GHG regulatory authority. Robin 
Bravender & Darren Samuelsohn, Senate Rejects Efforts to Block EPA Climate Regulations, 
POLITICO (Apr. 6, 2011, 6:18 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/52699.html. 
 44. Lauren Morello et al., Republicans Gut EPA Climate Rules, Slash Deeply Into Climate 
Research, Aid and Technology Programs, N.Y. TIMES CLIMATEWIRE (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/02/14/14climatewire-republicans-gut-epa-climate-rules-
slash-deep-87716.html. 
 45. INIMAI M. CHETTIAR & JASON A. SCHWARTZ, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW INST. FOR 
POLICY INTEGRITY, THE ROAD AHEAD: EPA’S OPTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS FOR REGULATING 
GREENHOUSE GASES 36–39 (2009). 
 46. Gregory B. Foote, Considering Alternatives: The Case for Limiting CO2 Emissions 
From Power Plants Through New Source Review, 34 ENVTL. LAW REP. 10642, 10644 (2004). 
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required to adopt implementation plans to keep the level of pollution in the 
ambient air within that state below this level.47  
If the EPA set a NAAQS for GHGs, presumably the entire country 
would either be in attainment or in non-attainment because GHGs do not 
remain localized in the atmosphere. Listing GHGs as criteria pollutants 
subject to a NAAQS would also likely make existing sources of GHGs 
subject to performance standards under the act.48 This would raise signifi-
cant compliance burdens. The EPA has not implemented a NAAQS for 
GHGs and has not announced any plans to take this step in the future. 
The difficulty of applying the BACT, Title V, and NAAQS provisions 
of the CAA to the problem of GHGs illustrates how the existing text of the 
CAA is poorly suited to regulate GHGs. Jody Freeman, the former Coun-
selor for Energy and Climate Change to President Barack Obama, recently 
wrote that using the CAA’s regulatory authority  
was never the Obama Administration’s preferred option for ad-
dressing climate change. The President had called on Congress to 
adopt new legislation imposing a market-based cap on carbon and 
other GHGs. This, it was thought, would produce a more compre-
hensive strategy than could be achieved under the existing CAA, 
which, despite its strengths, is not designed optimally for GHG 
regulation.49 
“Not optimal” is an understatement. The CAA’s many inadequacies for 
addressing GHGs make it likely that the regulations will be altered or 
discontinued entirely—either judicially, legislatively, or administratively.50  
Even if the EPA’s GHG requirements for new power plants remain in 
effect, they are inadequate to address the risk of climate change. First, the 
                                                                                                                      
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006). In areas that do not meet the NAAQS standards, the 
new source review standard applied is the lowest achievable emissions rate, which is a 
stricter standard than BACT. 42 U.S.C. § 7503(a)(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (2006). 
New sources of pollution in non-attainment areas must also obtain offsets—reductions in 
pollution equal to the amount of new emissions from the proposed new source. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7503(c) (2006). 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2006). 
 49. Jody Freeman, The Obama Administration’s National Auto Policy: Lessons from the 
“Car Deal”, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 343, 367–68 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
 50. If the EPA’s actions were designed in part to spur congressional legislation, that 
goal has not yet been met. The only thing that may be certain is that whatever the result of 
the EPA’s efforts to regulate GHGs under the existing CAA, the process has already proven 
to be, in the words one of the act’s primary legislative sponsors, John Dingell, a “glorious 
mess.” Jonas Monast, Tim Profeta & David Cooley, Avoiding the Glorious Mess: A Sensible 
Approach to Climate Change and the Clean Air Act 1 (Oct. 2010) (working paper, Duke 
Univ. Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/ 
climate/policydesign/avoiding-the-glorious-mess. 
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EPA interprets the BACT provisions of the CAA to mitigate pollution 
from a particular type of source—such as a coal-fired power plant.51 The 
EPA’s interpretation does not require direct comparison of different tech-
nologies of electricity generation, such as comparing the emissions profile 
of a coal plant with a nuclear plant. GHG BACT will not result in the 
dramatic GHG reductions necessary to significantly transform the elec-
tricity sector’s emissions profile.52 The International Energy Agency’s 2010 
World Energy Outlook suggests that to reach the goal of maintaining glob-
al warming below two degrees Celsius, the world’s electric generating 
capacity would need to shift dramatically to include much more renewable 
energy and nuclear power.53 While such shifts are possible using existing 
technologies,54 GHG BACT would only succeed in driving such results by 
accident.55  
The EPA has backed away from this methodology in the Proposed 
GHG NSPS Rule, which directly compares emissions from new coal plants 
against emissions from natural gas combined-cycle plants.56 However, the 
proposed NSPS standard is still a blunt command-and-control regulatory 
tool that will not efficiently promote cross-technology comparisons. Mini-
mum technology standards like BACT and the NSPS do not work very 
efficiently.57 Academics have argued for decades that the “best available 
technology” used in the CAA and Clean Water Act (CWA) tend to have 
high transaction costs and result in significant and costly litigation.58 These 
                                                                                                                      
 51. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PSD AND TITLE V PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR 
GREENHOUSE GASES, EPA-457/B-11-001 at 26 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
nsr/ghgdocs/ghgpermittingguidance.pdf. The Guidance suggests that a state permitting 
agency may seek to “redefine the source” and perform cross-technology comparisons under a 
BACT analysis, but is not required to do so. 
 52. Adler, Heat Expands, supra note 23, at 444–49; see also Jonathan Adler, Eyes on a 
Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2011) [hereinafter Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize].  
 53. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
12 (2010), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/weo2010sum.pdf. 
 54. See generally Mark Z. Jacobsen & Mark A. Delucchi, Providing All Global Energy 
with Wind, Water, and Solar Power, Part 1: Technologies, Energy Resources, Quantities and Areas of 
Infrastructure, and Materials, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1154 (2011). 
 55. BACT regulations would indirectly promote cross-technology comparisons by 
raising the price of electricity produced by coal plants, but because there is no comparison of 
the relative cost-effectiveness of using other generating resources, there is no guarantee that 
this effect on certain power plants would result in an efficient outcome. See Huber, supra 
note 3, at 1013. 
 56. See Proposed GHG NSPS Rule, supra note 24.  
 57. See Gregory E. Wannier et al., Prevailing Academic View on Compliance Flexibility 
Under § 111 of the Clean Air Act 7 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper RFF DF 11-29, 2011). 
 58. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1333 (1985). 
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standards also do not provide strong incentives for developing new, more 
environmentally friendly technologies.59  
II. ROLES FOR STATE ENERGY REGULATORS TO MITIGATE 
CLIMATE IMPACTS FROM NEW POWER PLANTS 
In the face of the policy uncertainty and inadequacy at the federal level 
and the need to invest in new power plants in the next decade, states should 
consider enlarging the traditional role of energy regulators to address 
GHGs from proposed new power plants. This section explores three dis-
tinct possible roles for state energy regulators that could serve as a bridge 
to a national or international climate regulatory policy.  
A. GHG Adders in Utility Regulatory Proceedings 
1. The Role of Adders 
Traditionally, the role of state energy regulators has been to approve 
the construction of new power plants that are reasonably necessary to meet 
expected energy demands. The rationale was to protect ratepayers against 
unnecessary costs from monopoly utilities. In some circumstances approval 
comes through proceedings where a utility filed an application to increase 
electricity rates on consumers, and in some states there are specialized 
“certificate of need” proceedings where construction of new power plants 
are considered either by the energy regulatory commission or a different 
siting board.60 This regulatory authority allows state regulators the oppor-
                                                                                                                      
 59. Id. at 1336; see also Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize, supra note 52, at 1, 36. 
 60. Jim Rossi, Transmission Siting in Deregulated Wholesale Power Markets: The Cross-
Sound Cable As a Case Study of FERC’s Role Under Existing Law, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y 
F. 315, 315 (2005). The continued validity of this regulatory oversight role has been called 
into question as the United States has moved toward competitive markets in electricity 
generation. Id. In a truly competitive, well-functioning market that adequately addresses 
externalities, there would be no need for a regulator to determine when a plant was neces-
sary and what kind of plant was appropriate to build. The price signal might adequately 
decide when and what kind of new generating plants should be built. Bernard S. Black & 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S. 
Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1385, 1389 (1993). But the United States does 
not have a system where externalities such as greenhouse gases are adequately addressed, nor 
does it have a truly competitive electricity generation market. Pierce, supra note 20, at 597. 
In particular, the retail electricity generation market is still regulated by traditional energy 
regulators in many states. Pierce, supra note 22, at 463. There may be policy rationales for 
this fact—perhaps retail consumers do not possess adequate expertise to analyze electricity 
supply options or perhaps individual retail customers not have sufficient bargaining power 
to make efficient choices about electricity generation supply. David B. Spence, Can Law 
Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 810–11 (2008); David Spence 
& Robert Prentice, The Transformation of American Energy Markets and the Problem of Market 
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tunity to analyze the prudence of proposed investments not just on the 
metric of financial cost, but on the true social cost of new generation with 
externalities included. 
In the early 1990s, a number of states experimented with what came to 
be known as environmental adders. The basic concept is fairly straightfor-
ward: utility regulatory proceedings should quantitatively include the social 
cost of environmental externalities (as an “adder”) in the costs of power 
plants.61 Typically these programs express the adder as a value of harm per 
unit of electricity generated.62 
Consider a simplified example. Assume a state energy regulator has a 
duty to issue a certificate of need prior to a utility commencing construc-
tion on a new electric generating unit. The commission has a statutory duty 
to protect utility customers from unreasonable rates charged by monopoly 
utilities. The commission achieves this duty by approving generating op-
tions that 1) are in fact necessary to meet projected demand, and 2) have 
the lowest expected costs for consumers. If the expected cost of electricity 
from a new coal-fired generating unit is 9.5 cents per kilowatt-hour and the 
expected cost of electricity from a new nuclear unit is 11.5 cents per kilo-
watt-hour, one might expect the utility to propose, and the commission to 
approve, the coal-fired generating unit as the lowest cost unit. If, however, 
the estimated social costs posed by GHG emissions are considered as costs 
of electricity generation, the lowest cost option may change. Should, for 
example, the expected social cost of climate change risk from each kilowatt-
hour of electricity be estimated to be 3 cents for a coal plant, but 0 cents 
per kilowatt-hour from a nuclear plant, the nuclear plant becomes the low-
est cost option. 
In practice, the analysis is more complicated than this simplified exam-
ple suggests. Rather than a single cost figure, it is sensible for both utilities 
and regulators to consider a range of potential costs for a facility. The ex-
pected cost of a facility itself is dependent on a number of variables, 
                                                                                                                      
Power, 53 B.C. L. REV. 131, 134 (2012). Or the continued existence of regulated retail elec-
tricity markets may be best explained by interest group politics—utilities are powerful 
players in state politics who can effectively bar reforms that would threaten their monopoly 
status. Pierce, supra note 22, at 477–79; George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 
BELL J. ECON. MGMT. 3, 3 (1971). Whatever the reason, regulated retail electricity markets 
continue to exist in the United States, and likely will continue to exist in the next decade. 
 61. Black & Pierce, supra note 60, at 1399–1400. Public utility commissions have a 
variety of regulatory powers over electric utilities. When environmental adders have been 
implemented in the United States, they have typically been used in proceedings either to (1) 
approve construction of new generating facilities, or (2) to approve long-term plans for 
meeting electricity demands, often through a process known as integrated resource planning. 
Id.; see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A 
NUTSHELL 383–84 (4th ed. 1999).  
 62. Black & Pierce, supra note 60, at 1400. 
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including future projected fuel prices. Fuel prices can fluctuate significant-
ly, so costs are often projected over a variety of scenarios. The decision of 
what type of power plant is reasonable and prudent also includes evaluation 
of more than just lowest generation cost, but also improved system reliabil-
ity. Accordingly, there is always some degree of qualitative analysis baked 
into regulatory decisions regarding whether particular power plants should 
be built. Future GHG prices may also be best considered over a variety of 
scenarios, making the analysis more complicated and subjective, but ulti-
mately leading to a more well-informed process.  
The experiment with environmental adders in the 1990s was fairly 
short-lived in many states. A few states adopted quantitative adders, but 
many other states merely incorporated environmental attributes qualitative-
ly in regulatory proceedings.63 Others, like Michigan, explicitly rejected the 
use of environmental adders based on reasons such as the public service 
commission’s lack of institutional competence to evaluate environmental 
impacts, the perceived lack of rigorous scientific evidence linking emissions 
to environmental harms, and the existence of other government agencies 
perceived to be better suited to address environmental externalities.64 In 
the case of Massachusetts, an attempt to use environmental adders was 
found to exceed the statutory authority of the utility commission.65 In other 
states, the appeal of using environmental adders began to wane when the 
1990 CAA Amendments were fully operational and the EPA’s cap-and-
trade program for acid rain pollutants made environmental adders for those 
pollutants less necessary. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, states 
shifted their attention to other policy options, such as renewable portfolio 
standards and “green” utility generating fleets.  
GHG adders are worth reconsidering for GHG mitigation purposes. 
In many instances, their implementation will not require significant chang-
es to existing regulatory processes. Many states already require a certificate 
of need process before allowing a utility to build a new generating facility. 
In some cases, GHG adders may not even require amendments to energy 
regulatory statutes.66 It may even be possible to construe a regulatory stat-
                                                                                                                      
 63. FANG & GALEN, supra note 14, at 35–38. 
 64. Id. at 35. 
 65. Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 1994). 
 66. For example, Rhode Island’s Energy Facility Siting Board, which must approve 
new electric generating units, is directed to consider the environmental costs of new energy 
facilities in its approval process. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 42-98-2(3), 42-98-8(3), 42-98-
11(3) (West 2012). The Illinois Public Utility Act provides in a legislative findings section 
that the goals of electricity regulation include “the protection of the environment from the 
adverse external costs of public utility services so that (i) environmental costs of proposed 
actions having a significant impact on the environment and the environmental impact of the 
alternatives are identified, documented, and considered in the regulatory process.” 220 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(b) (West 2012). Florida’s Electrical Power Plant Siting Act 
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ute that does not mention environmental issues—but that directs the com-
mission to regulate the rates of electricity service and provide general 
supervision of the terms and conditions of utility service—as authorizing 
GHG adders. It is well-recognized that rate regulation’s primary intent is 
to achieve low costs of electricity service for consumers, but this could be 
conceptualized so as to allow the commission to consider all of the costs of 
service—including environmental costs or potential future regulatory com-
pliance costs—under the broad term “costs”.67  
                                                                                                                      
authorizes the board ruling on a power plant certification to consider whether constructing a 
facility will “[e]ffect a reasonable balance between the need for the facility [as determined by 
the Florida Public Service Commission] and the impacts upon air and water quality, fish and 
wildlife, water resources, and other natural resources of the state resulting from the con-
struction and operation of the facility.” FLA. STAT. § 403.509(3)(e) (West 2012). The 
Florida Public Service Commission has the exclusive authority to determine whether there 
is a need for the proposed facility under the act. FLA. STAT. § 403.519(3) (West 2012). In 
2007, the Florida Public Service Commission used this authority to deny that need existed 
for two coal-fired power plants, noting that the applicant had not determined it was the 
most cost-effective alternative available given the threat of climate regulation and uncertain 
coal and natural gas prices. In re Petition for Determination of Need for Glades Power Park 
Units 1 and 2 Elec. Power Plants in Glades Cnty., by Fla. Power & Light Co., Docket No. 
070098-E1, Order No. PSC-07-0557-FOF-EI, Order Den. Pet. for Determination of Need, 
(July 2, 2007), available at http:// www.psc.state.fl.us/library/filings/07/05350-07/05350-
07.pdf. Other states with certificate of need laws would likely need a statutory change in 
order to implement environmental adders. In Virginia, the State Corporation Commission, 
which must approve construction of new generating units, has the duty to consider the effect 
of the facility on the environment. If, however, the project receives an environmental permit 
from a state or federal agency, the Commission “shall impose no additional conditions with 
respect to such matters [that were governed by the permit].” VA. CODE ANN. § 56-46.1(a) 
(West 2012). North Dakota’s electric regulatory statue is more direct on the usage of envi-
ronmental adders by the electric regulatory commission: they are flatly prohibited for 
proceedings regarding “planning, selection, or acquisition of electric resources.” N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. 49-02-23 (West 2012). 
 67. A commission engaging on this route with only broad statutory authority to 
regulate utilities will likely face challenges. For example, the Massachusetts Department of 
Public Utilities attempted to incorporate environmental externalities into a utility planning 
processes in the early 1990s. See generally Rudy Perkins, Electricity Deregulation, Environmen-
tal Externalities and the Limitations of Price, 39 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1018–21 (1998). The 
Massachusetts Supreme Court, in response to an appeal brought by a Massachusetts utility 
and the National Coal Association, determined that the department exceeded its statutory 
authority by implementing a system of environmental adders. Mass. Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of 
Pub. Utils., 643 N.E.2d 1029, 1033 (Mass. 1994). The decision was based in part on the 
notion that the department “does not have responsibility for the protection of the environ-
ment” but merely regulates utility rates. Id. at 1033. The court determined that the 
department could consider environmental costs so far as they were likely to result in in-
creased actual compliance costs with existing or foreseeable environmental regulations, but 
did not have the authority to consider environmental externalities as costs themselves. Id. at 
1034. The statutory analysis was fairly thin, apparently relying upon the stereotypical divi-
sion of authority between energy and environmental regulators that many academic 
commentators have found problematic. 
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2. Criticisms of Adders 
General criticisms of state energy regulators playing roles in climate 
change mitigation efforts are considered in Section D. Two potential criti-
cisms specific to GHG adders are considered here. 
a. Valuation 
The most significant challenge to implementing a system of GHG ad-
ders is determining the value or range of values for the social cost of 
GHGs. To be socially efficient, the value of a GHG adder should attempt 
to precisely value the social cost of the pollution addressed.68 Determining 
this value is a difficult estimation challenge requiring a number of assump-
tions, making the process prone to variations in outcomes.69 Perhaps the 
toughest hurdle is the remaining scientific uncertainty concerning the 
expected long-term impacts of climate change.70  
The selection of a discount rate is another difficult aspect of valuing 
GHG externalities. A discount rate is used to discount future costs and 
benefits to give them a net present value today. The discount rate is par-
ticularly important because climate change plays out over a period of many 
decades, and a small change in the discount rate can have a huge impact on 
the net present value of a future harm discounted to today’s prices.71 More 
importantly, however, because climate change is an intergenerational prob-
lem, a large discount rate can be unfairly used to enrich the current 
generation by underestimating, and pushing back, the costs borne on future 
generations. Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling argue that no discount 
rate should be applied to future climate change harms because of these 
intergenerational effects.72 However, some discounting to account for ex-
                                                                                                                      
 68. Calabresi, supra note 21. 
 69. PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 61, at 384. 
 70. See IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supra note 6, at 72–73. 
 71. Michael Greenstone et al., Estimating the Social Cost of Carbon for Use in U.S. 
Federal Rulemakings: A Summary and Interpretation 11–12 (MIT Ctr. for Energy & Envtl. 
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2011-006, 2011). Discount rates could be determined by 
either “descriptive” or “prescriptive” approaches. Id. at 12, 15. Descriptive approaches at-
tempt to discern discount rates from observations of actual human behavior (either through 
experimentation or by implication). Id. at 12. Prescriptive approaches, rather than looking to 
outside evidence to select a discount rate, instead attempt to explicitly include normative 
approaches regarding how to weigh future costs against future benefits. Id. Descriptive 
approaches have been more widely used in cost-benefit analyses in the United States. De-
scriptive approaches are probably not appropriate for discounting climate change risks. 
There is significant evidence that humans do not rationally value future risks against current 
costs in their actual behavior. See ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 17, at 20–24. 
 72. Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1570–71 (2002). 
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pected inflation over a period of decades is probably appropriate when 
comparing costs today with benefits in future decades. 
A third valuation issue is determining the geographic scope of the im-
pacts considered. Some states may consider only valuing expected climate 
change impacts within the borders of the state itself. This would be prob-
lematic: to efficiently internalize the costs of global externality, the proper 
scale should be to consider the expected global impacts. Otherwise, energy 
regulators are allowing ratepayers to externalize the costs of their consump-
tion onto others.73 Moreover, to the extent adders are implemented as 
financial risk mitigation measures, they should attempt to value expected 
compliance costs of national or international GHG regulations. If future 
regulations are well designed, they should more closely track global exter-
nality costs than any state-specific costs. Additionally, because there is 
already an extensive scientific and economic literature regarding worldwide 
valuation, state regulators can reduce their administrative burdens by 
adopting these measures rather than engaging in costly state-specific valua-
tion proceedings.  
Another valuation challenge is that state energy regulators may have 
little institutional competence in valuing GHG externalities.74 While this is 
an obstacle, there is also an obvious remedy. Commissions can hire expert 
staff or consultants to fill this competency gap. And though many states are 
facing difficult budget deficits,75 public utilities commissions often remain 
insulated from state budget crises since many are not funded by state taxes, 
but by charges to regulated utilities.76  
Because of the valuation difficulties, public utility commissions that 
implemented environmental adders in the 1990s often used a shortcut. 
Rather than trying to estimate the actual value of the social cost, they in-
stead calculated the adder based on the marginal cost of complying with 
existing environmental command-and-control regulations.77 This is a poor 
methodology for valuing social cost; it attempts to determine a value 
                                                                                                                      
 73. Climate change may actually be perceived as net beneficial to certain states. Some 
cold-weather regions may experience extended agricultural growing seasons, reduced home 
heating needs, or increased tourism seasons. Other regions with access to water may find 
themselves with valuable natural resources in a water-constrained world. The potential for 
this analysis offers a hook for emissions-intensive interest groups to argue that a particular 
state’s adder should be reduced. This is yet another reason why states implementing adders 
should use a global externality value. 
 74. Black & Pierce, supra note 60, at 1428. 
 75. STEPHEN C. FEHR ET AL., THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, STATE OF THE 
STATES: HOW THE RECESSION MIGHT CHANGE STATES 2 (Diane Fancher et al. eds., 2010), 
available at http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2010/2010_State%20of%20 
the%20States_web.pdf. 
 76. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS 460.112 (2009).  
 77. Black & Pierce, supra note 60, at 1420. 
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through a strained, circular assumption. As Kip Viscusi has pointed out, our 
regulatory regimes often bear little resemblance to a reasoned economic 
analysis of risk avoidance.78 Despite the difficulties, regulators using envi-
ronmental adders should attempt to base them on the estimated social cost 
of pollution, not the costs of required pollution controls.  
Due to climate change’s complicated effects, regulators will never have 
complete certainty regarding its expected impacts. However, it is clear that 
there is some risk caused by climate change, and policymakers can at least 
begin to attempt to estimate the costs of its implications.  
Despite the difficulties of valuing GHG externalities for adder pro-
grams, the same valuation problems arise when trying to determine the 
proper level of a carbon price, and a similar problem arises when trying to 
determine the appropriate cap in a cap-and-trade regime. Public utility 
commissions with a staff of trained economists who hear expert testimony 
may be more likely than Congress to accurately value the externalities of 
GHGs. The commission process in most states is often less politicized and 
more technocratic than a legislative process—though it is certainly not free 
from politics and there always remains a risk of regulatory capture.  
The valuation of GHG externalities will likely continue to improve as 
policymakers gain more scientific understanding about the likely impacts of 
climate change. If implemented, GHG adders should adjust accordingly 
with the current best scientific and economic analyses. Indeed, the imple-
mentation of state GHG adders would likely aid in the progression of 
valuation techniques. By deeply diving into the valuation methodologies in 
contested case hearings with real consequences, states might be able to 
discern best practices that would inform future national or international 
carbon pricing efforts. 
Finally, because of the many variables in valuing GHG externalities, 
different state energy regulators could have wide variations. This multi-
variability could result in heightened regulatory uncertainty regarding how 
GHGs will be—and should be—treated in the United States. To help miti-
gate this issue, collaborative federalism might serve a useful role.79 Even if 
the federal government is politically unable to implement a carbon price, 
the expertise of its economists at various agencies and national laboratories 
could collaborate to create a consensus and peer-reviewed methodology for 
valuing GHG externalities. State energy regulators could still hear evi-
                                                                                                                      
 78. See Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Safety at Any Price?, 25 REGULATION 54, 58 (2002), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv25n3/v25n3-12.pdf. 
 79. Cf. Hari Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change: Implications for the 
Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 290–92 (2011) (suggesting that the Obama 
Administration consider policies that enable state and local governments to take action on 
GHG mitigation in the transportation sector by means such as technical assistance and 
grants). 
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dence and make their own decisions about the proper figure, but they 
would likely give great deference to such a consensus. 
This process has already begun. In 2010, the United States government 
established an interagency working group composed of federal regulators to 
fix a dollar value to the social cost of CO2 emission. The exercise resulted 
net present values per ton of CO2 of $5, $21, $35, based on the use of dif-
ferent discount rates, and a sensitivity analysis of $65 a ton.80 The $65 value 
represents a potential high cost scenario; the difference in the first three 
values is primarily attributable to the use of different discount rates.  
b. Enforcement 
Unlike emissions taxes, which give power producers continuing incen-
tive to reduce emissions, environmental adders do not provide the same 
incentive to reduce emissions once approval is granted.81 Critics of GHG 
adders therefore claim that producers will keep emissions at the estimated 
amount only if regulators exercise vigorous oversight.82 Given the strict 
GHG reporting requirements already mandated by federal law,83 this regu-
latory oversight should not be difficult or costly to achieve. Initial approvals 
of the plant should be made contingent on operating within the estimated 
emissions targets, with appropriate penalties and enforcement mechanisms 
for exceeding the projections.  
Moreover, the assertion that enforcement will prove costly and difficult 
seems to presume that individual power plant operators have the ability to 
significantly alter the plant’s emissions profile. This seems unlikely given 
the relatively static technological attributes of individual electric generating 
facilities. To put it another way, a natural gas plant is not suddenly going to 
start burning coal and double its expected emissions. Such a change would 
require massive capital changes to the plant.84 For example, the primary 
                                                                                                                      
 80. U.S. GOV’T INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, TECHNICAL 
SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 
UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,866 at 3 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/Social-Cost-of-Carbon-for-RIA.pdf. 
 81. Black & Pierce, supra note 60, at 1405. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009). 
 84. ASPEN ENVTL. GRP., IMPLICATIONS OF GREATER RELIANCE ON NATURAL GAS 
FOR ELECTRICITY GENERATION 4 (2010), available at http://www.publicpower.org/files/ 
PDFs/ImplicationsOfGreaterRelianceOnNGforElectricityGeneration.pdf (“Aspen’s research 
uncovers no instances of coal plant retrofits to natural gas and, in fact, virtually all of the 
public references to conversion of coal to natural gas or repowering turn out instead to be 
replacements. The reason is economics. Even the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), when it looked at . . . switching the Capitol Building power plant to natural gas, 
noted that not only was switching all U.S. coal-fired generation infeasible due the gas 
supply and infrastructure required, but that it would be more cost-effective to construct new 
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measures that an individual coal-fired plant can take to vary its emissions 
profile depend on fundamental plant design—either improving the electri-
cal efficiency of the generation or adding on a carbon capture and 
sequestration component.85 These are not things that are altered easily, 
cheaply, or discreetly. There may be some emissions changes that can be 
obtained by choosing different types of fuel sources, but the differences do 
not seem as dramatic for GHG emissions as they are for sulfur dioxide 
emissions, which can be significantly lowered by burning coal with a low 
sulfur content.86 Marginal changes to fuel type are not likely to produce 
dramatic changes in GHG emissions profiles.  
Finally, even if such gaming were possible and even if enforcement 
oversight were relatively lax, it could still be deterred by imposing signifi-
cant fines in the event of gaming. The penalty should be set at the 
estimated social cost of carbon, which would allow it to simulate a carbon 
tax if a utility seeks to exceed its projected GHG emissions. Enforcement 
mechanisms would also be required to effectively implement cap-and-trade 
mechanisms or carbon taxes. While a national enforcement agency may 
have economies of scale over a state enforcement agency, the need for en-
forcement is not a convincing reason to refuse to implement a GHG adder 
scheme altogether. 
B. Participation in Clean Air Act Permitting Proceedings 
If states do not enable energy regulators to play a role in considering 
GHG externalities when approving new generation in the standard energy 
regulatory proceedings, energy regulators may find a role in environmental 
regulatory proceedings. While state environmental regulators are not re-
quired to make cross-technology comparisons as part of the BACT 
permitting process under the CAA, they do have discretion to require such 
                                                                                                                      
gas-fired units than to retrofit existing coal-fired units to burn natural gas.”). A price on 
carbon might affect the decision whether to run an individual coal plant or another form of 
electricity generation such as a natural gas plant. But these dispatch decisions take place 
once the decision to build the facilities have already been made and the capital to build them 
is already spent. GHG adders attempt to impact the generation decision prior to the ex-
penditure of upfront capital. 
 85. OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
AVAILABLE AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES FOR REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
FROM COAL-FIRED ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS 25 (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
nsr/ghgdocs/electricgeneration.pdf 
 86. Compare id. at 20 (explaining that average carbon dioxide emissions vary approxi-
mately 10%—from 205.3 to 227.4 pounds per million BTU—among the four major U.S. coal 
varieties) with U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2002 WITH 
PROJECTIONS TO 2020, MARKET TRENDS—COAL, available at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/ 
archive/aeo02/coal.html (explaining that use of low sulfur coal can reduce average SO2 
emissions by 85%). 
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comparisons.87 Environmental regulators also have authority to consider a 
“no build” alternative before permitting a new source of air pollution.88 
State environmental regulators who wish to exercise this discretion may 
seek to require two distinct conditions before issuing an air permit for a 
new electric generating facility: first, whether there is truly a need for the 
new power plant and, second, whether the proposed generation technology 
best meets that need in a manner that mitigates climate change risk. State 
energy regulators could play a key role in analyzing these questions. Their 
expertise in determining need and analyzing the prudence of investments 
in power plants could play a helpful role in assisting state environmental 
regulators in their air permitting decisions. For example, energy regulators 
could implement a GHG adder system to analyze different generation 
options.  
State and federal permitting authorities have rarely used the CAA to 
compare cross-technology alternatives. One noticeable exception occurred 
recently in Michigan, where Governor Jennifer Granholm relied on this 
authority to issue an executive directive requiring an alternatives analysis to 
be completed during CAA permitting for new coal-fired plants.89 
Granholm directed the Michigan environmental agency to consider wheth-
er a need existed for the electricity provided by the proposed plant.90 She 
                                                                                                                      
 87. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PSD AND TITLE V PERMITTING GUIDANCE FOR 
GREENHOUSE GASES, EPA-457/B-11-001 at 26–27 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
nsr/ghgdocs/ghgpermittingguidance.pdf.  
 88. Before a permit may be granted, interested persons are allowed to “submit written 
or oral presentations on the air quality impact of such source, alternatives thereto, control 
technology requirements, and other appropriate considerations.” 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2) 
(2006). Accordingly, commenters can and often do suggest that the plant not be built at all, 
but the demand be met instead by conservation, using existing resources, or other alterna-
tives such as using alternative electric generating sources. The CAA itself provides no 
guidance on whether and how a permitting agency should evaluate these comments. Under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, however, an agency’s decisionmaking must not be arbi-
trary or capricious, which some Supreme Court precedent has suggested entails some level 
of reasonability in decisionmaking. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it 
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”). Presuma-
bly an agency which is required to “consider” alternatives to a proposed power plant in the 
permitting process would have the authority to make determinations of whether the permit 
should be granted or not based on those alternatives. This could open the door for cross-
technology comparisons or a “no build” alternative in the CAA permitting process. 
 89. Mich. Exec. Directive No. 2009-2 (Feb. 3, 2009), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/granholm/0,4587,7-168-36898-208125--,00.html. The Executive 
Directive also noted that a provision of Michigan state law required consideration of feasible 
and prudent alternatives prior to administrative actions that may result in pollution. 
 90. Id. 
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further ordered the agency to deny a permit application to a coal-fired 
power plant if it determined, with the assistance of the Michigan Public 
Service Commission, “that a feasible and prudent alternative to the con-
struction of a new proposed coal-fired electricity generating plant exists 
consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety, and 
welfare that would better protect the air, water, and other natural resources 
of this state.”91 This directive resulted in Michigan Public Service Commis-
sion proceedings that analyzed both the need for the electricity and 
alternative generation technologies.92  
Relying primarily on the analyses that the need for the facilities was 
not adequately demonstrated, the Michigan environmental agency denied 
the permit applications for two coal-fired power plants in 2010.93 The agen-
cy also granted a permit for another coal-fired power plant on the explicit 
condition that a significant quantity of existing coal-fired electricity genera-
tion be retired.94 The permit denials were challenged in two Michigan trial 
courts. Both courts found the denials based on need for the facilities to be 
unlawful.95 Appeals are currently pending.  
                                                                                                                      
 91. Id. 
 92. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Staff Rep., Docket No. U-15996, Consumers Energy 
Electric Generation Alternatives Analysis for Proposed Permit to Install (PTI) No. 341-07 
for an Advanced Supercritical Pulverized Coal Boiler at the Karn-Weadock Generating 
Station, Essexville, Mich. (Sept. 8, 2009), http://efile.mpsc.state.mi.us/efile/docs/15996/ 
0190.pdf; Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Staff Rep., Docket No. U-16000, Wolverine Power 
Cooperative Electric Generation Alternatives Analysis for Proposed Permit to Install (PTI) 
No. 317-07 for Circulating Fluidized Bed Coal Boilers at Rogers City, Mich. (Sept. 8, 2009), 
http://efile.mpsc.state.mi.us/efile/docs/16000/0144.pdf; Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Staff 
Rep., Docket No. U-16077, Holland Board of Public Works Electric Generation Alternatives 
Analysis for Proposed Permit to Install (PTI) No. 25-07 for Circulating Fluidized Bed Coal 
Boiler in Holland, Mich. (July 7, 2010), http://efile.mpsc.state.mi.us/efile/docs/16077/ 
0077.pdf. 
 93. Letter from G. Vinson Hellwig, Chief, Mich. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, to Brian L. 
Warner, Wolverine Power Supply Coop. (May 21, 2010), available at http://www.deq.state.mi.us/ 
aps/downloads/permits/pubnotice/317-07/DenialLtr.pdf; Letter from G. Vinson Hellwig, 
Chief, Mich. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, to David G. Koster, Power Res. Dir., Holland Bd. of 
Pub. Works (Aug. 20, 2010), available at http://www.deq.state.mi.us/aps/downloads/permits/ 
PubNotice/25-07/25-07DenialLtr.pdf. 
 94. Letter from G. Vinson Hellwig, Chief, Mich. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, to Steven 
T. Wawro, Manager, Next Generation (Dec. 29, 2009), available at http://www.deq.state.mi.us/ 
aps/downloads/permits/pubnotice/341-07/341-07CoLtr.pdf; Michigan Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality, Permit to Install No. 341-07, Appendix D, Coal-Fired Power Plant 
Retirement Plan and Schedule Agreement 73–74, available at http://www.deq.state.mi.us/ 
aps/downloads/permits/pubnotice/341-07/341-07_Rev1.pdf. This permit has subsequently 
been voided by request of the permitted utility, which has abandoned plans to build the 
plant. Letter from Sue Thelen, Permit Section, Dept. of Envtl. Quality, to Rajesh Swamina-
than, Consumers Energy (Dec. 5, 2011) (on file with author). 
 95. Wolverine Power Supply Coop., Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Env’t, No. 
10-7686-CE (Missaukee Cnty. Cir. Ct. Jan. 28, 2011) (on file with author); City of Holland 
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Granholm’s policy was highly visible and became quite politicized in 
Michigan. The Michigan Attorney General accused the Governor of acting 
unlawfully.96 The Speaker of the Michigan House of Representatives, a 
member of the Governor’s political party, was sharply critical of the policy.97 
Seventy-four members of the 110-member House signed a petition asking 
the Governor to rescind the directive.98 Much of the criticism of the di-
rective focused on the alleged loss of construction jobs that would have 
been created by construction of new coal-fired power plants.99 At the re-
quest of Granholm, the Michigan Public Service Commission estimated 
that the construction of one of the plants whose permit was denied under 
the policy would have resulted in a massive rate increase for customers.100 
In 2011, under a new gubernatorial administration, the Michigan environ-
mental agency issued permits for both of the previously denied proposed 
coal plants.101  
C. Regulator Selection of Generating Technology 
A third potential role for state energy regulators would be a fairly sub-
stantial departure from the traditional energy regulatory model. States 
could shift the responsibility for selecting the generation resources from 
regulated utilities to the regulator. Anthony White, a former member of the 
United Kingdom’s National Grid Executive Committee and a current advi-
sor to institutions that finance energy projects, has recently suggested that 
the United Kingdom reorient its electricity regulatory policy in this manner 
                                                                                                                      
v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res. & Env’t, No. 10-002031-AA (Ottawa Cnty. Cir. Ct. Dec. 15, 
2010) (on file with author).  
 96. Mich. Op. Att’y Gen. 7224 (2009) available at http://www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/ 
datafiles/2000s/op10301.htm. 
 97. Gongwer News Serv., Coal Fired Fury: Did Gov. Granholm’s Stance on Power Plants 
Ignite Speaker Dillon’s Independence, DOME MAG. (Oct. 9, 2009), http://domemagazine.com/ 
blogs/wu100909. 
 98. Harding: DEQ Should Not Be Involved In Energy Policy or Regulation, DOWAGIAC 
NEWS (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.dowagiacnews.com/2009/03/27/harding-deq-should-not-
be-involved-in-energy-policy-or-regulation/. 
 99. See id. 
 100. Letter from Orjiakor Isiogu, Chairman, Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, to Jennifer 
Granholm, Governor of Mich. (May 21, 2010), available at http://www.deq.state.mi.us/aps/ 
downloads/permits/pubnotice/317-07/PSCNotificationLtrtoGov.pdf. 
 101. Letter from G. Vinson Hellwig, Chief, Mich. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, to Brian L. 
Warner, Wolverine Power Supply Coop. (June 29, 2011), available at http://www.deq.state.mi.us/ 
aps/downloads/permits/PubNotice/317-07/Remand/317-07AplLtr.pdf; Letter from G. 
Vinson Hellwig, Chief, Mich. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, to David G. Koster, Power Res. Dir., 
Holland Bd. of Pub. Works (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.deq.state.mi.us/aps/downloads/ 
permits/PubNotice/25-07/25-07AplLtr.pdf. 
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to mitigate the risk of climate change.102 White’s proposal is notable be-
cause he had previously been a strong proponent of electricity competition 
in the United Kingdom. However, he now suggests that government regula-
tors should play a much more active role in choosing new generation 
facilities in order to deal with climate risk.  
White proposes that a competitive wholesale electricity market is un-
likely to produce the investments needed to dramatically reduce GHG 
emissions in the United Kingdom despite the country’s participation in the 
European Union’s GHG cap-and-trade regulation and its own domestic 
renewable energy mandate.103 White argues that competitive electricity 
generation markets do not necessarily always produce the lowest cost gen-
eration solution; rather, he believes that markets often produce the most 
financeable solution.104 And the most financeable option is usually that 
which has already been financed, i.e., relying on technologies that are al-
ready widely used.105  
The most financeable electricity generation technology is currently 
natural gas-fired plants, which have relatively low initial capital costs and 
short construction times.106 Accordingly, natural gas has accounted for a 
large portion of the generating capacity built in the United Kingdom since 
the country moved to a competitive wholesale market.107 Likewise, natural 
gas-fired generation has comprised 81% of the total U.S. generating capaci-
ty additions in the past decade.108 This trend appeared even before the 
massive reductions in natural gas prices in recent years. Most of the re-
maining power generating units built in the last decade were wind turbines, 
which are financeable because they are the lowest cost option in the segre-
gated renewable energy market created by state renewable energy 
mandates.109 
From a GHG mitigation standpoint, the increase in natural gas-fired 
generation is beneficial in the short-term. Natural gas-fired generation 
                                                                                                                      
 102. Anthony White, Is Our Power Market Fit for Purpose?, Remarks to the U.K. 
Energy and Utilities Forum Event: Copenhagen, Carbon Floors and the Single Buyer (Nov. 
3, 2009). 
 103. Id. at 3. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Jim Watson, The Technology that Drove the ‘Dash for Gas’, 11 POWER ENGINEERING 
J. 11, 16 (1997); see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST OF NEW GENERATION 
RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 at 4 (July 2012) [hereinafter 
LEVELIZED COST], available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/electricity_generation.cfm. 
 107. Watson, supra note 106, at 11. 
 108. Most Electric Generating Capacity Additions in the Last Decade Were Natural Gas-
Fired, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (July 5, 2011), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm? 
id=2070. 
 109. See Renewable and Alternative Fuels: Wind, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/wind/wind.html. 
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produces an estimated 50% of the carbon dioxide per unit of electricity 
when compared with coal-fired generation.110 Yet regardless of the short-
term benefits of natural gas, in order to successfully mitigate the long-term 
risk of climate change, the electricity generation sector must dramatically 
reduce its GHG emissions.111 Building traditional natural gas-fired facilities 
for the next forty years will not successfully achieve these goals. Zero-
carbon electric generating options—such as fossil fuel plants with carbon 
capture and sequestration technologies or nuclear power plants—tend to be 
capital-intensive and have long lead times.112 Other zero-carbon technolo-
gies—like wind and solar farms—do not have long lead times but remain 
capital-intensive investments.113  
White believes that the current electricity markets are unlikely to pro-
duce enough financeable large zero-carbon generation projects, even with a 
carbon price and renewable energy mandate. Accordingly, he proposes that 
the United Kingdom move to a “single buyer” system to procure new elec-
tric generating units.114 The government would specify the type of 
generation sought and use a competitive bidding process to determine the 
builder and owner of the power plant. The systems would still be privately 
owned, but would sell power to U.K. distribution utilities through periodic 
auctions. The government “buyer” would actually not own or operate 
plants, but merely direct the type of generation to be built.115 
The United Kingdom, which has a national electricity regulatory sys-
tem, could more easily implement such a system nationally than the United 
States.116 Creating a national single buyer system in the United States 
would require a dramatic shift in energy regulatory authority from states to 
                                                                                                                      
 110. Natural Gas, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy- 
and-you/affect/natural-gas.html (last updated Oct. 17, 2012). However, there have been 
recent suggestions that natural gas emitted during the fuel’s extraction process—the so-
called “fugitive” emissions—may significantly reduce its positive greenhouse profile. Natural 
gas is composed primarily of methane gas, which is itself a greenhouse gas that has a much 
greater global warming potential than carbon dioxide does. See Robert W. Howarth et al., 
Methane and the Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas from Shale Formations: A Letter, 106 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 679, 679–80 (2011). But see Lawrence M Cathles III et al., A Commen-
tary on “The Greenhouse-Gas Footprint of Natural Gas in Shale Formations” by R.W. Howarth, R. 
Santoro, and Anthony Ingraffea, 113 CLIMATIC CHANGE 525, 525–35 (2012). 
 111. See supra text accompanying notes 51–53, 102–105. 
 112. White, supra note 102. 
 113. Solar and wind farms have maintenance costs, but have no ongoing fuel costs, 
unlike fossil fuel facilities. See LEVELIZED COST, supra note 106. 
 114. White, supra note 102. 
 115. Id. 
 116. About Us, OFF. GAS & ELECTRICITY MARKETS, http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ 
About%20us/Pages/AboutUsPage.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
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the federal government.117 An individual U.S. state, however, could begin to 
implement a system of direct government choice over generation technolo-
gy. Such a change would be quite complicated and politically controversial. 
It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider all of the possible imple-
mentation challenges with such a reform, but a brief sketch of the possible 
benefits and challenges follows. 
1. Implementation Options 
There are a number of variations of White’s proposal that might be 
implemented by a U.S. state. First, a state could decide to require incum-
bent utilities to divest themselves from their current electric generating 
assets and rely solely on purchased power contracts that result from a com-
petitive bidding process directed by government regulators.118 If generation 
were divested, the distribution of electricity, which most economists 
acknowledge is a natural monopoly warranting regulation, could remain 
regulated by traditional methods.119 Electricity generation, which most 
economists believe is not a natural monopoly, would then become subject to 
the competitive bidding system.120 When the state energy regulator deter-
mined that new generating capacity was necessary to serve consumer 
demands, it could require utilities to enter into a long-term power purchase 
agreement with a new generator, using technology selected by the regula-
tor.121 The construction of the new facility could even be financed by a state 
authority using government bonds. 
A state could also allow utilities to maintain ownership of their existing 
assets, but require that all electricity supply be competitively bid, subject to 
restraints set by the regulators. The regulated utility could submit bids to 
provide new generation. Competitive bidding best practices might be bor-
rowed from government or private sector contracting to ensure that the 
incumbent utilities maintained incentives to produce electricity efficiently 
                                                                                                                      
 117. Indeed, it may likely be more politically feasible for the United States to pass a 
cap-and-trade system than to implement a national system of wholesale power regulation. 
 118. This method could avoid constitutional takings problems if the utilities would 
divest their holdings through a market process that would compensate utility shareholders 
for the fair market value of their assets. Requiring the sale of assets might be a boon for 
utility shareholders if they are allowed to recover a sale value for older assets that have 
already been fully or mostly paid for by utility rates. It may, however, result in increased 
electricity prices for customers if market electricity prices are greater than regulated costs of 
service. 
 119. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 61, at 9. 
 120. See id. at 51–52. 
 121. This could be done on an individual utility basis, or, in states with more than one 
regulated utility, could be accomplished with a multi-utility power purchasing pool. 
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and at low cost.122 Long-term power purchase agreements could be carefully 
drafted to ensure proper incentives for efficient delivery of electricity.123 
Government-directed competitive bidding proceedings for electricity gen-
eration have already been widely and successfully used in the United 
States.124 
In addition to deciding whether incumbent utilities maintain any gen-
erating capacity, state energy regulators would also need to decide how 
specific the bidding parameters would be. One method is for the energy 
regulator to choose the needed electricity capacity and an environmental 
profile for electricity generation, but leave the choice of the technology to 
the bidding process (i.e., “build 1,000 megawatts of power with fewer than 
X greenhouse gas emissions per kilowatt-hour”). This method would allow 
the most competition among different technologies, but still require poten-
tially costly monitoring of generation to ensure compliance.  
Alternatively, the energy regulator could select the capacity and actual 
technology to be used (i.e., “build a 1,000 megawatt nuclear plant”). In this 
scenario the market participants would still compete over price factors such 
as the location and operational design of the power source. Choosing a type 
of generation may reduce the need to monitor GHG emissions after con-
struction. It also may minimize the precise importance of the GHG 
valuation problem by instead simply selecting a technology with minimal 
GHG emissions. This method would also allow the regulator to consider 
the attributes of different energy technologies to manage the system’s relia-
bility needs. For example, perhaps due to the retirement of a number of 
older coal plants, the energy regulator may determine that a dispatchable 
“baseload” plant is necessary to meet customer demands.  
The energy regulator could also decide the location of the generation 
(i.e., “build a 1,000 megawatt offshore wind farm plant in this exact loca-
tion”). Such direction would allow the government to take account of the 
localized environmental and aesthetic impacts that are often contentious in 
the siting of electricity generation. It would also allow for a more nuanced 
analysis of the impact on the reliability of the electricity grid and necessary 
                                                                                                                      
 122. For example, states might consider reverse auction mechanisms to discover the 
lowest prices that the market could bear to produce electricity. 
 123. One manner of requiring competitive power supply might be to require regulated 
utilities to use the competitive day-ahead markets for all of their power sales. Because this 
option does not offer long-term price certainty, however, this would probably not be a 
preferable option. California’s attempts at harnessing competitive electricity markets failed 
in part because they made just such a requirement. Spence, supra note 4, at 437–39. 
 124. Paul L. Joskow, Regulatory Failure, Regulatory Reform, and Structural Change in the 
Electrical Power Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: 
MICROECONOMICS 1989 at 125, 176–78 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1989). 
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transmission or distribution upgrades.125 In general, however, the more 
constraints the government places on the available options, the less likely 
there will be a substantial range of options and prices in the competitive 
bidding process. 
Under this system, an energy regulator could attempt to consider other 
environmental externalities in addition to GHGs, or it could simply use 
this method to focus on GHGs. Either way, a winning bidder would still 
need to comply with existing federal regulations by obtaining any permits 
required by the EPA or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Thus, state 
energy regulators need not consider every potential environmental exter-
nality when setting bid parameters. The more externalities considered, the 
more complex and subjective setting the bid criteria becomes. The process 
could ultimately become unwieldy.126 If an energy regulator deemed other 
environmental externalities were sufficiently mitigated by traditional envi-
ronmental regulation, it might focus primarily on the tradeoffs involved in 
climate change mitigation. 
2. Potential Benefits 
A move to competitive bidding for generation would continue the 
trend of opening electricity generation to more market competition, which 
is an efficient manner of allocating resources.127 Deciding on new electricity 
generation is a complex balancing act that includes a number of tradeoffs. 
All methods of electricity generation, including methods that use renewable 
fuels, result in some type of environmental harm.128 Markets may not be 
effective at resolving these difficult tradeoffs—even with environmental 
                                                                                                                      
 125. So long as the state does not restrict potential bidders to firms within the state, 
choosing a location within the state should not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. See 
infra text accompanying notes 234–249. 
 126. Indeed, environmental impacts occur throughout the value chain of the electricity 
production process—from coal mining and transport to coal ash disposal. Attempting to 
consider and evaluate all of these holistically is a difficult undertaking. 
 127. The new market for electricity supply, like every market, would have its outer 
bounds defined by the government. There is no such thing as a completely free market. 
Markets are always constrained by the background rules created and enforced by the gov-
ernment. In the United States, these typically have been the common law doctrines of tort, 
contract, and property, together with state and federal statutes and agency regulations. The 
market itself is a tool—a means to an end—which may be the promotion of efficiency or the 
promotion of freedom so long as it does not impact the freedom of others. Setting the 
parameters of what we as a society are willing to buy and sell is completely appropriate in a 
market-based system, See generally Joseph Singer, Things That We Would Like to Take for 
Granted: Minimum Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 139 (2008). 
 128. Wildermuth, supra note 1, at 375–79. 
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taxes or GHG adders—because ultimately it is incredibly difficult to place 
a specific monetary value on environmental externalities.129 
The competitive bidding model could also be used to effectuate a more 
comprehensive merger of the energy and environmental regulatory systems 
in the electricity sector. As Peter Huber has described, the traditional regu-
latory model for new generating units involves a maze of required permits 
where many different agencies can say no, but no individual agency can say 
yes.130 Rather than having one government decisionmaker squarely confront 
the full range of trade-offs involved in any decision to build new generating 
capacity, the current system has a number of disparate permitting require-
ments, focused variously on water usage, air emissions, waste disposal, cost 
to consumers, etc.131 Ultimately an investor-owned utility company propos-
ing a new generating plant is concerned with maximizing shareholder 
profits and will therefore attempt to run the regulatory gauntlet by choos-
ing the type of facility most likely to garner approval. But this does not 
mean the utility is making an optimized choice that best serves the public 
interest. Indeed, this fractured and uncoordinated regulatory process cre-
ates significant transaction costs and incoherent policies.132 As Huber puts 
it: 
A regulatory system that makes choices through sheer inertia, bu-
reaucratic complexity, and failure to coordinate will move in 
preferred directions only by blind luck. Whatever regulatory  
solutions policymakers may individually favor, progressive environ-
mental management demands affirmative regulatory supervision.  
The final irony is that under the most paralyzed of all possible 
regulatory systems, only the regulatees have any real power to 
choose among different generation or conservation technologies. 
That they may do so by following the path of least regulatory re-
sistance rather than the path of greatest safety or environmental 
protection should come as no surprise: one major justification for 
regulation in the first place was that utilities lack appropriate in-
centive to police themselves. And even if a utility is environmentally 
conscious and well-intentioned, it is powerless to implement its 
agenda unless it can win approval from the regulatory system.133 
                                                                                                                      
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 74–80; see also Joseph P. Tomain, “Our Genera-
tion’s Sputnik Moment”: Regulating Energy Innovation, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 389, 395–96 
(2011). 
 130. Huber, supra note 3, at 1024–25. 
 131. Id. at 1003. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1053. 
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Centralized regulation in environmental areas, as Huber points out, is 
needed not only to address externalities but also to “consent to some risks 
and environmental effects and to reject others in light of the best available 
assessment of the aggregate public interest.”134 While there will no doubt be 
significant disagreement over what types of generation actually best serve 
the public interest, it may be better to squarely face that question than to 
use the currently fractured system of regulatory approval.135  
It might be preferable to have a system that streamlines all regulation 
of utility plant siting into one uniform approval and selection process, ex 
ante, and then relies on private markets to provide the lowest cost of sup-
ply.136 Rather than enduring the transaction costs of multiple permitting 
processes (including creating taxes or emissions rights), a single regulatory 
body could decide which type of generation is most prudent and allow 
markets to attain the lowest feasible price. The significant environmental 
impacts associated with electricity generation may be better considered by a 
government regulator—ultimately accountable to the public—making a 
thoughtful affirmative decision about what type of generation is appropri-
ate than by a private corporation—ultimately accountable to the profit 
motivation of shareholders—making a decision about generation based on 
compliance with a myriad of cost-imposing regulations.  
While this system would make the government more responsible for 
energy choices, it may in some ways reduce the amount of government 
oversight of the electricity industry. The existing energy and environmental 
regulatory frameworks already set significant parameters on new generating 
resources.137 Consolidating the regulatory process into as few proceedings 
as possible could have a number of positive effects. First, it may significant-
ly reduce the transaction costs of the existing regulatory process—both in 
the permit processing and in terms of environmental monitoring and com-
pliance. Second, it would potentially result in enhanced regulatory certainty 
in a system with large amounts of regulatory risk. This could in turn make 
it easier to finance and build new electricity generation. Finally, it might 
reach more rational results regarding which types of energy systems most 
effectively provide low-cost service in an environmentally prudent manner. 
                                                                                                                      
 134. Id. at 1009. 
 135. Id. at 1054. 
 136. This would, of course require significant changes from the status quo. But given 
that many federal environmental statutes are implemented by state agencies, a state with the 
will to merge energy and environmental protection could begin to move in that direction—
either by statute, or in states that give governors broad executive reorganization authority, by 
executive order. Rather than having the air division of state environmental agency issue a 
permit under the CAA and the water division issue a permit under the CWA, and the state 
utility commission issue a certificate of need, these regulatory proceedings might be merged 
into a single siting process that complied with the relevant federal regulations. 
 137. Huber, supra note 3, at 1005–07. 
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3. Potential Disadvantages 
A more streamlined regulatory approval process would have significant 
potential drawbacks as well. One advantage of fractured regulatory pro-
ceedings is expertise in mitigating a particular risk, which may be lost in 
such a merged system.138 Such a major change in the regulatory process 
comes with transition costs and may lead to additional regulatory uncer-
tainties. A streamlined system may also not result in increased regulatory 
certainty if the decision made by the government agency were at risk of 
easy reversal.139 This type of system may not easily adapt to changing 
knowledge of environmental impacts and may lock in choices that are ulti-
mately imprudent in hindsight. Most significantly, this system places a 
great deal of authority in a single government body that might be subject to 
political influences, agency capture, or inadequate incentives to minimize 
costs and maximize environmental protection. In particular, very precise 
selection criteria or narrow bid submission time frames might be used by 
regulators to compromise the competitive bidding process by practically 
selecting a winning bidder in the selection criteria.  
Before his appointment to the judiciary, Supreme Court Justice Ste-
phen Breyer described some of the pitfalls of having government agencies 
select a single private sector owner of a scarce item.140 First, it is difficult—
perhaps impossible—to craft truly objective selection standards without 
                                                                                                                      
 138. But such regulatory focus may also lead to tunnel vision and lack of focus on the 
bigger picture. 
 139. For example, utilities and banks might fear they could not rely on a successful bid 
if there is a chance that the bid would be overturned by a subsequent decision of the board—
perhaps if the membership of the decisionmaking board changed after the election of a new 
Governor. To address this issue, the board’s governing procedures could generally give 
preclusive effect to previous decisions of the board, such that they could not be easily recon-
sidered. The governing board could also be given long-term, staggered terms to lessen the 
likelihood of swift changes in policy after an election. Another method of ensuring against 
regulatory “flip-flops” would be to enable private entities that successfully win generation 
contracts to use government bonding authority. State bonding authority may be used au-
thorized for private activity bonds such as the building of hospitals. INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., TAX-EXEMPT PRIVATE ACTIVITY BONDS COMPLIANCE GUIDE (2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4078.pdf. Allowing state bonding authority to be used to 
finance electricity projects would have a number of beneficial attributes. It would potentially 
lower the cost of capital for electricity generators and therefore result in lower costs for 
consumers. In addition, government bonding would level the playing field for smaller 
independent power producers against large incumbent utilities. Finally, it would likely 
address the possibility that the government could reverse its approval decision because the 
bonds issued could include enforceable covenants against the state to preclude a regulatory 
reversal. 
 140. Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alterna-
tives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 566–68 (1979). 
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some subjective judgment entering the analysis.141 Second, if there are too 
many individual standards or factors simultaneously being applied to the 
decision without clear rules about how to weigh factors, the decisionmaking 
process becomes unmanageable and risks inconsistency.142 These difficulties 
raise suspicions of corruption when political appointees award valuable 
entitlements to the private sector.143 
Breyer is describing systems that do not use competitive bidding, but 
which use administrative proceedings to determine a single recipient of a 
right. The competitive bidding process itself will temper some of his objec-
tions, such as improper politicization of awards. Breyer’s analysis would still 
apply to the process of setting the bid parameters, however. These concerns 
can be assuaged by attempting to use sound electricity planning practices in 
determining the bid parameters. Utilities and utility commissions have 
decades of experience in integrated resource planning of electricity supply, 
and a number of best practices have emerged,144 yet the process, multivaria-
ble by nature, remains prone to subjectivity. 
Moreover, some of Breyer’s critiques of government resource alloca-
tions also apply to private decisions. Private utility executives must weigh a 
number of difficult objectives in deciding what type of power plant to 
build. There is no perfectly objective way to make this decision.145 As Hu-
ber pointed out, the fractured regulatory system leads utility companies to 
select the new power plant most likely to be approved by government regu-
lators—not necessarily the most socially optimal power plant. As White 
describes, the financial markets also constrain utility executives’ choice as to 
which types of facilities will be loaned money. And the ultimate driver of 
any private corporation’s behavior is to maximize shareholders’ expectations 
of returns on investment. In the traditional regulatory system this has 
meant investing heavily in new capital projects, which earn utilities a rate of 
return set by public utility commissions. Balancing all of these factors is no 
less subjective because a utility executive, rather than a government agency, 
is performing the task.146  
                                                                                                                      
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. STATE AND LOCAL ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTION NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF 
ENERGY, USING INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLANNING TO ENCOURAGE INVESTMENTS IN 
COST-EFFECTIVE ENERGY EFFICIENCY MEASURES 5–7 (2011). 
 145. The existing process relies heavily on price, a fairly objective measure, but for-
ward-looking estimates of price include a number of subjective and contestable assumptions. 
See generally VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY AT THE CROSSROADS 121–80 (2003) (noting the diffi-
culties of forecasting energy trends). 
 146. This type of subjective balancing is not new to electricity generation. The Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission has been making holistic, subjective determinations about 
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Environmental taxes designed by legislatures to internalize externali-
ties could provide objective price signals to private utilities. However, a 
system of taxes relies on legislatures to determine the proper externality 
price and then individual private companies to make decisions. This system 
may have the sheen of objectivity, but at its core, a system of taxes is not 
significantly less subjective about the crucial risk tradeoffs. If a tax is set by 
statute, it may also less be adaptable to changing circumstances than a 
government regulatory process.  
Finally, this proposal would likely be portrayed as a dramatic govern-
ment intervention into private markets and could be politically infeasible in 
the United States.147 This charge could be rebutted by noting that the pro-
posal could actually bolster the use of markets in wholesale electricity  
provision. In addition, the electricity sector is unique in the size of its 
externalities, particularly the externality of climate change risk. Moreover, 
this industry is already heavily regulated. Energy regulators tell utilities 
how much they can charge customers. Environmental regulators imple-
menting BACT tell utilities what types of scrubbers they must put on their 
power plants.148 Laws in twenty-nine states tell utilities they must sell a 
minimum amount of energy produced by renewable sources.149 For over 
thirty years, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act has mandated that 
public utilities purchase power produced from renewable fuels.150 And 
16.5% of the electric generating capacity in the United States is actually 
owned by a government entity today.151 This policy proposal would not 
make a substantial difference in the level of regulatory oversight over the 
industry, and may actually simplify the regulatory environment if the pro-
cess can bring together disjointed permitting activities.  
In addition, current retail electricity consumers often do not have any 
real choice over the type of generation that they are provided. Nor do they 
ultimately care where the electricity they use daily actually comes from, so 
long as their bills aren’t too high and the lights still turn on. Their electric 
utility makes the generation decision for them, subject to regulation based 
                                                                                                                      
hydropower license approvals for decades. However, this analysis typically doesn’t include 
analysis of alternative generating technologies. Huber, supra note 3, at 1016. 
 147. Electricity generation is a large revenue generator for incumbent utilities, which 
have considerable political power and influence. Utilities will not want to lose their monopo-
ly protections over generation. See generally Stigler, supra note 60. 
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2006). 
 149. Ryan Wiser, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., The State of the Market: Update on 
the Implementation of U.S. Renewables Portfolio Standards, Remarks at Renewable Energy 
Markets Conference 4 (Nov. 16, 2011), available at http://renewableenergymarkets.com/docs/ 
presentations/2011/Ryan%20Wiser.pdf. 
 150. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (Supp. VI 2011). 
 151. See AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N, U.S. ELECTRIC INDUSTRY STATISTICS 3 (2012), 
http://www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/USElectricUtilityIndustryStatistics.pdf. 
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on environmental and cost factors.152 Shifting the generation decision to a 
government agency is not substantially different from a customer choice 
perspective. In either circumstance, someone else with more technical 
expertise makes the decision about the best type of generation to provide 
electricity, working to lower all of the relevant costs, including environmen-
tal impacts. Rather than a profit-maximizing corporation, in this case it 
would be a government entity ultimately accountable to the democratic 
process.  
Despite these arguments, this proposal would likely be characterized as 
a dramatic government intervention, which may ultimately be fatal to its 
adoption.153 At a time when many have called for a comprehensive national 
energy policy, however, it is a measure worth considering.  
D. Criticisms of State Policies to Mitigate Global Climate Change 
1. The Mismatch of Global Causes and Local Solutions 
Professors Bernard Black and Richard Pierce argue, with much intui-
tive appeal, that the only proper response to an international problem like 
climate change is an international response, noting that “[o]ne state acting 
alone, even one country acting alone, can accomplish little (except self-
impoverishment).”154 From a rational actor perspective, no state should be 
                                                                                                                      
 152. It is true that in states with retail electricity competition it is theoretically possible 
that electricity providers could compete on the source of their generation rather than just 
the price of their product, but there is little evidence this actually occurs in practice. There 
are also voluntary “green generation” programs that allow retail customers to purchase 
“renewable energy” from their providers for additional fees. See, e.g., Green Currents, DTE 
ENERGY, http://www.dteenergy.com/residentialCustomers/productsPrograms/greenCurrents
/greenCurrents.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). These programs do not ensure that actual 
renewably produced electrons flow into the customers home, but that the utility purchases a 
small amount of renewable electricity (or purchases the tradable environmental attribute of a 
renewably produced unit of electricity). The vast majority of utility customers do not exercise 
either of these options, however. They simply pay their bill to the incumbent electric company. 
 153. See Jon Hanson, Ideology, Psychology, and Law, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND 
LAW 3, 19 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012); Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The 
Ligitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7–22 (2004). 
There are however, some ways in which this type of system might be a more politically 
achievable method of mitigating climate risk than carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems. 
Unlike carbon taxes and allowance purchasing requirements, there is a less visible link to 
increased customer costs from a system that affirmatively chooses one type of generation. 
Government decisionmaking regarding electricity generation may also be seen as preferable 
to corporate decisionmaking if it is framed as promoting very popular clean energy against 
polluting technologies. See Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State 
Renewable Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Spring 2007, at 10, 10. 
 154. Black & Pierce, supra note 60 at 1416–18; see also Janice A. Beecher, Why Public 
Utilities Should Ignore Externalities, 19 U.S. ASS’N FOR ENERGY ECON. DIALOGUE, 2011, at 1, 
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willing to impose costs on itself in what may be a futile attempt to mitigate 
a risk that, by itself, the state is unable to significantly impact. Nonetheless, 
this view may underestimate the potential value of state actions when glob-
al or national actions are not likely to be forthcoming. Global climate 
change is the textbook example of a difficult global collective action prob-
lem. In the context of an imperfect and irrational policy environment, state 
GHG actions may have a place. 
First, the sum of many non-global actions to reduce GHGs emissions 
may have a significant effect on mitigating climate change risk.155 Many 
individual states and countries are already acting to mitigate GHGs.156 As 
Katherine Trisolini has argued, even the sum of hundreds of U.S. local 
government commitments to reduce GHGs would have an effect that is 
globally significant.157  
Second, state actions can help to improve subsequent federal or inter-
national actions. States can serve as laboratories to work out the bugs of 
complicated regulatory responses.158 For example, states’ attempt to value 
the externalities caused by GHGs in contested administrative hearings will 
result in a heightened scrutiny to the methodologies used in valuing GHG 
externalities.  
Third, state actions to address GHGs may drive regulated industries to 
support uniform federal regulatory policies that preempt state action. Over 
twenty-five years ago, E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman, and John C. 
Millian argued that the CAA was adopted not because Congress was val-
iantly seeking to protect the air, or environmental groups overcame 
collective action problems in persuading Congress, but because “two well-
organized industrial groups, the automobile industry and the soft coal 
industry—were threatened with a state of affairs even worse from their 
perspective than federal air pollution legislation—namely, inconsistent and 
progressively more stringent environmental laws at the state and local 
                                                                                                                      
3–5, available at http://dialogue.usaee.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article& 
id=139&Itemid=366. 
 155. Indeed, it may be the only realistic short-term solution to begin implementing 
low-cost mitigation efforts. Reaching consensus on international climate policies is proving 
to be as difficult as passing a comprehensive U.S. climate policy. See Cinnamon Carlarne, 
The Glue That Binds or the Straw That Broke the Camel’s Back?: Exploring the Implications of U.S. 
Reengagement In Global Climate Change, 19 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 113, 147–48 (2010). 
 156. The European Union has been operating a GHG cap-and-trade program for a 
number of years. Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L275)32(EC). State renewable 
energy standards have resulted in dramatic changes to the U.S. electricity generation mar-
ket, collectively driving a huge national investment in wind energy over the past decade. 
Renewable and Alternative Fuels: Wind, supra note 109. 
 157. Trisolini, supra note 9, at 676. 
 158. Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems, 12 
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15, 64–67 (2004). 
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level.”159 Likewise, a number of state regulatory actions preceded the 1990 
CAA amendments addressing the interstate problem of acid rain.160 More 
recently, Benjamin Ewing and Douglas Kysar have argued that in the Unit-
ed States’ system of overlapping authority, government actors not ideally 
suited to address a problem may nonetheless serve an important role by 
taking actions that “prod or plead” other institutional actors to enact poli-
cies.161  
This potential benefit of state regulatory actions should not be over-
emphasized, however. State actions could prompt both pro- and anti-
regulatory preemption measures from the federal government.162 Rather 
than promoting federal GHG regulation, state regulatory moves might 
instead promote federal prohibitions of state GHG regulations without 
accompanying federal regulation. 
Fourth, GHG mitigation efforts by state energy regulators may aid the 
continued technological developments of low carbon electricity generation. 
Creating demand for manufacturing at scale is an essential step in driving 
technological advancements for cost-effective low carbon technologies, 
which some view as a market failure.163 In an era of budget austerity, this is 
unlikely to be accomplished solely by government subsidies. In order to 
drive markets for low carbon generation, the costs of fossil fuel-fired gener-
ation should represent their full social costs.  
To someone who predicts or assumes states are rational economic ac-
tors, it is difficult to explain why state and local governments would chose 
to take actions that add costs for their citizens and cannot by themselves 
succeed in achieving their aims. It is a dangerous oversimplification, how-
ever, to conceive of any government action as if it were attributable to a 
single reason, economically rational or not. The political environment in 
states or countries may drive governments to take action on climate change 
despite its not being economically rational under a narrow view of the 
state’s self-interest.164 
                                                                                                                      
 159. E. Donald Elliott, Bruce A. Ackerman & John C. Millian, Toward a Theory of 
Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 326 
(1985). 
 160. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: the Case of 
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1514–15 (2007). 
 161. Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an 
Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 354–55 (2011). 
 162. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 160, at 1500. 
 163. Tomain, supra note 129, at 397. 
 164. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 160, at 1519–20. It is possible that states foresee 
that future federal or international climate regulation is likely and are acting to mitigate the 
future regulatory compliance costs. It may also be the case that some state policymakers 
intend to spur the federal government to act by passing local regulatory measures. The 
smaller size of states makes it easier for environmental groups to successfully lobby for state 
Hofmeister_Final_WEB 1/22/2013 1:51 PM 
Fall 2012] Roles for State Energy Regulators in Climate Change Mitigation 105 
Black and Pierce suggest that there may be a role for state efforts to 
address GHGs “if regulators believe that out-of-state harms should be 
given significant weight.”165 They continue:  
We have grave doubts, though, about whether [public utility com-
missions] should be giving away ratepayers’ money in this way, 
even for a noble cause. Such a decision runs directly contrary to 
the central justification for [commissions’] existence—to ensure 
that consumers do not pay too much for electric power. Altruism is 
a quintessentially political decision, which politicians should make, 
and then take credit or blame at the polls. It is not the job of ap-
pointed regulators.166 
This statement improperly frames non-global actions on climate change as 
“altruism” or “giving away ratepayers’ money.”167 This way of framing GHG 
policies obscures their purpose. It is not simply “altruism” to take actions to 
mitigate a potentially catastrophic global environmental risk. 
One could just as easily frame the failure to price GHG externalities as 
enabling ratepayers to pass the risk of climate change produced by their 
electricity usage to others. Black and Pierce are correct that energy regula-
tors should attempt to keep prices low for consumers. But energy regulators 
have always strived to do more than ensure customers pay the lowest prices 
for electricity. They have also traditionally focused, for instance, on ensur-
ing reliable service and whether the utility has enough revenue to serve its 
customers. Energy regulators should also strive to ensure that consumers 
are paying the true costs of their electricity. Refusing to price GHGs might 
be tantamount to the willful exploitation of outsiders by refusing to recog-
nize a known externality. Accounting for these costs therefore is not purely 
altruism, but attempting to make electricity prices accurately reflect the 
true costs of electricity consumption.168 
GHG mitigation efforts by state energy regulators also have a purpose 
distinct from climate change mitigation—they serve as a sound financial 
                                                                                                                      
level policies than federal policies. Elliott, Ackerman & Millian, supra note 159, at 329. State 
political environments can also vary significantly from the federal political environment. For 
example, the coal or automobile industries may not be powerful in any individual state. See id. 
 165. Black & Pierce, supra note 60, at 1419. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Some state utility commissions will likely choose not to impose additional costs of 
electricity upon ratepayers because of competitiveness concerns. They may view themselves 
as competing with other states for jobs, and see lower electricity rates as essential to attract-
ing and retaining jobs. For the vast majority of businesses, however, a marginal increase in 
electricity rates will not be the determining factor in their location decision, particularly if 
there are already sunk costs at an existing location. 
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risk mitigation measure. Because there is a strong likelihood that federal 
regulation will eventually address GHGs, it is prudent for state regulators 
to account for the financial cost of this risk when deciding on new generat-
ing plants. Power plants often cost billions of dollars in upfront costs and 
have expected lives that stretch decades.169 Attempting to price the exter-
nality’s social cost is a decent metric for incorporating potential future 
federal GHG regulatory costs.170 
Finally, state energy regulators should not necessarily defer to legisla-
tors when determining whether and how to address GHG externalities.171 
Elected politicians may be poorly suited to internalize GHG externalities 
because of the short-term nature of the U.S. election cycle and the long-
term implications of climate change.172 A more politically insulated and 
expert body such as a public service commission is more likely to be able to 
accurately value GHG externalities, just as an insulated expert body is 
likewise better able to set utility rates.  
State solutions to global problems are not ideal or efficient. There are 
significant theoretical, political, and practical problems with state GHG 
mitigation actions.173 Despite these problems, however, state actions may 
nonetheless be warranted. 
2. Double Counting with Other Regulatory Measures 
Another valid criticism lodged against state climate mitigation policies 
is that they might inefficiently duplicate federal environmental regulations. 
In order to efficiently internalize an externality, a policy should attempt to 
price the social harm accurately and attribute it to the activity that pro-
duced the harm.174 Theoretically, an environmental adder should therefore 
attempt to discount costs of compliance with environmental laws designed 
                                                                                                                      
 169. See FANG & GALEN, supra note 14; ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, supra note 17.  
 170. Indeed, for many state energy regulators who see their role as primarily ensuring 
low prices for consumers without regard to environmental concerns, this federal regulatory 
risk will be the primary rationale for implementing GHG adders. 
 171. Public Service Commissioners themselves are elected, not appointed, in thirteen 
states. Elected Commissions, NAT’L ASS’N REG. UTIL. COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naruc.org/ 
about.cfm?c=elected (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 172. See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 1184–85. 
 173. In addition to the problems noted above, states which move forward with GHG 
policies may help create a level of temporary climate policy certainty within their state, but 
may actually exacerbate the existing regulatory uncertainty regarding overall federal GHG 
regulation in the United States. This regulatory uncertainty is particularly problematic for 
firms like electricity providers who must make extremely large capital investments. Andrew 
P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 179, 228 (2005).  
 174. Calabresi, supra note 21, at 500, 505. 
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to address the same problem.175 If environmental harms are over-weighted 
by duplicative regulations, society would underutilize certain forms of 
electricity generation.  
Such discounting would not be necessary in certain instances. For ex-
ample, in states that are implementing GHG cap-and-trade programs, such 
as California176 or the New England states implementing the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),177 energy regulators would not need to 
estimate the cap-and-trade compliance costs when implementing a GHG 
adder policy. The energy regulator could just ignore any potential RGGI 
expenses and instead use the GHG adder. The proposed plant may need to 
eventually acquire emission allowances, but whether these allowances ade-
quately internalize the cost of GHGs ex post is a separate question from 
whether the power plant should be built ex ante.178 
Discounting for “double counting” becomes more difficult when the 
regulatory system uses a command-and-control system like BACT or 
NSPS. A state implementing an environmental adder system could attempt 
to discount the costs of compliance with such regulations. Because attempts 
to put a precise value on regulatory overlap is such a complex regulatory 
challenge, state energy regulators may reasonably choose not to attempt to 
discount these policies, even if the result is theoretically inefficient deter-
rence of GHGs. There are a number of rationales for this policy choice. 
First, when harms and costs are uncertain anyway, perhaps some over-
deterrence is consistent with the precautionary principle.179 Moreover, the 
current costs of low-carbon generation are currently very similar to the 
costs of new fossil fuel-fired generation.180 When this price difference is 
added to the large rate base of many large utilities, the resulting premium 
paid for low-emission energy will often be very small for individual rate-
payers. 
                                                                                                                      
 175. PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 61, at 384. 
 176. See California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 2006). 
 177. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2012). 
 178. Indeed, it seems likely, in the case of RGGI, that the costs of compliance will be 
lower than the value of the externality that GHGs create for society. In 2010, for example, 
the RGGI price per ton of carbon dioxide was hovering around $2 per ton. POTOMAC 
ECON., ANNUAL REPORT ON THE MARKET FOR RGGI CO2 ALLOWANCES: 2010 (2010), 
available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/MM_2010_Annual_Report.pdf. This is far lower than 
the current range of estimates for the social cost of GHGs. U.S. GOV’T INTERAGENCY 
WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, supra note 80, at 3. 
 179. Indeed, it may be economically efficient to favor environmental preservation over 
development in the context of irreversible harms. Kenneth J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, 
Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 Q.J. ECON. 312 (1974). 
 180. LEVELIZED COST, supra note 106, at 4. 
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Second, it is clear that not every state (and certainly not every country) 
will adequately incorporate climate risk into their regulations affecting 
energy construction and consumption. Potential over-deterrence in some 
areas still results in some mitigation in a world where the climate risk is 
being significantly under-deterred overall.181 
Third, fossil fuels have received huge subsidies and regulatory ad-
vantages for decades.182 Given this historical imbalance in favor of fossil 
fuels, there should be less concern if the balance for future investments tips 
slightly in favor of lower emissions technologies. 
Finally, the scale of the sources and numbers of GHGs itself may be a 
reason to have overlapping mitigation policies at different government 
levels. A single centralized policy may be insufficient to meet the GHG 
mitigation need if it is poorly designed. For example, a national cap-and-
trade program will be of little use if the cap is set at a level that will not 
generate sufficient emissions reductions. Precisely because climate change 
is such a large and multi-faceted problem, policymakers may not be able to 
put all of their eggs in the basket of one international pricing policy. Effec-
tive and conservative risk mitigation might warrant duplicative mitigation 
efforts from a variety of levels of government. 
Imposing a state GHG mitigation for new power plants on top of the 
existing federal regulatory framework will be a duplicative and inefficient 
method of regulating GHGs.183 Having two distinct GHG regulations for 
new power plants may not add as many administrative or transaction costs 
as might appear at first glance, however. First, the additional requirement 
of BACT for GHGs does not significantly increase the transaction costs of 
the existing environmental permitting processes. Any new power plant that 
relies on combustion, for example, will already need to secure a BACT 
permit for a number of other air pollutants besides GHGs.184 
Second, environmental adders do not add significant new transaction 
costs to compliance with utility regulations. Regulated utilities already 
                                                                                                                      
 181. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010 EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 3 (2010), available at http://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/weo2010sum.pdf. 
 182. Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 355, 375 (1990). 
 183. A system that adequately prices GHG externalities into the decision of what type 
of generation to build would render unnecessary a BACT or NSPS review process for GHG 
controls. A national regulation that prices GHG externalities into the costs of new power 
plants would be a superior policy to both a system of state GHG adders and a command-
and-control regulatory system for GHGs. But the prospects of such a policy seem quite slim 
in the near future. 
 184. Because BACT for GHGs is a new requirement, however, there is certainly some 
significant litigation risk involved with what actually constitutes “best available control 
technology” for GHGs. 
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must receive either ex ante or ex post approval by state utility regulators for 
major investments in new power plants.185  
Moreover, when deciding whether to invest in new electric generating 
plants, utilities already routinely factor in an expected price for GHGs 
under the expectation that at some point GHGs will become regulated 
pollutants.186 Indeed, failing to account for these risks would probably 
constitute a failure to adequately serve the interests of utility sharehold-
ers.187 Many lenders also require utilities to consider GHG risks in order to 
borrow money to construct new plants.188 
A process that gives state utility commission approval of the exact 
methodology for valuing GHG externalities might therefore actually be 
welcomed by utilities. It would give them certainty regarding their ability 
to recover reasonably made investments if they used GHG accounting 
methodologies approved by their regulators.  
3. Interaction with Electricity Competition 
The U.S. move toward wholesale electricity competition has benefited 
consumers. As Paul Joskow and Roger Noll have written, “[i]f economics 
has any scientifically settled issues, one is surely that price and entry regu-
lation in perfectly competitive industries generates economic 
inefficiencies.”189 In a perfectly competitive electricity market, a price signal 
could theoretically determine when new power plants should be built, mak-
ing regulatory approvals unnecessary.190 Competition among suppliers 
                                                                                                                      
 185. Davies, supra note 1, at 494–96. 
 186. See, e.g., CONSUMERS ENERGY, ELECTRIC GENERATION ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS,
27 n.35 (June 2009), http://efile.mpsc.state.mi.us/efile/docs/15996/0001.pdf. 
 187. See Securities and Exchange Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related 
to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
 188. A coalition of large U.S. financial institutions which provide financing to utilities 
for new generating units has announced it will conduct “enhanced due diligence” before 
financing any new power plants that burn fossil fuels. See Leading Wall Street Banks Establish 
the Carbon Principles, CARBON PRINCIPLES (Feb. 4, 2008), http://carbonprinciples.org/ 
documents/Carbon%20Principles%20Press%20Release%20Final.pdf. This enhanced due 
diligence process requires consideration of alternative low-carbon resources such as energy 
efficiency and renewable energy, as well as using “conservative” assumptions, including 
measuring significant costs from future GHG regulations. See Fossil Fuel Generation Financ-
ing Enhanced Environmental Diligence Process, CARBON PRINCIPLES, 6, http://carbonprinciples.org/ 
documents/Carbon%20Principles%20Enhanced%20Diligence%20Final_pdf.zip (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2012). 
 189. Paul L. Joskow & Roger C. Noll, Regulation in Theory and Practice: An Overview, in 
STUDIES IN PUBLIC REGULATION 1, 4 (Gary Fromm ed., 1981). 
 190. While this is sound in theory, in practice, competitive markets may not send a 
price signal to suppliers to build a new plant until the supply shortage causes a bottleneck 
and spike in electricity prices. At this point a number of market players may simultaneously 
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could protect consumers from excessive or unnecessary costs. Accordingly, 
some might argue that regulatory pre-approvals attempting to address 
GHGs could disrupt the positive benefits of competitive electricity mar-
kets.191  
Regulatory approvals of electricity supply decisions made by regulated 
retail monopoly utilities can be made consistent with wholesale electricity 
competition, however. Many states continue to regulate retail electricity 
supply with traditional economic regulation, but participate in competitive 
wholesale markets.192 Retail customers of regulated monopoly utilities 
cannot opt out of service because of potentially lower electricity prices 
from an alternative supplier, but they can still reap benefits from wholesale 
competition. Competitive wholesale markets provide regulated utilities an 
option to buy and sell electricity and provide important price discovery 
information to regulators.  
To encourage needed investments in new generation by regulated retail 
utilities in competitive wholesale markets, devices like a certificate of ne-
cessity that guarantees cost recovery for a power plant can play a valuable 
role. Michigan, for example, recently enacted a certificate of necessity law 
after a comprehensive study determined the existing market dynamics 
would not likely create the right incentives for investing in needed new 
                                                                                                                      
try to build new supply, overcorrecting for the shortage. Because utility investments tend to 
be so expensive and bulky, this can lead to significant inefficiencies.  
 191. See Black & Pierce, supra note 60, at 1407. 
 192. Retail electricity competition, unlike wholesale electricity competition, has not 
proven to be a boon for most relatively small ratepayers who are unsophisticated about 
electricity consumption and contracts. As Professor Pierce has noted,  
It is much easier to structure an effectively competitive wholesale electricity mar-
ket than to structure an effectively competitive retail market . . . . In short, as the 
size of the typical transaction declines, transaction costs increase relative to trans-
action benefits until, at some point, costs exceed benefits. Thus, it is relatively 
easy to design a market in which electricity distributors and industrial customers 
that purchase large quantities of electricity can obtain large net benefits as a result 
of their access to a competitive market, but it is devilishly difficult to design a 
market in which small consumers can obtain net benefits by purchasing on a com-
petitive market. 
Richard Pierce, Completing the Process of Restructuring the Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 451, 462–63 (2005). The move toward retail electricity competition in the United 
States has slowed significantly since the California electricity crisis of 2000. E.g., David B. 
Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 774 (2008). 
Currently, fifteen states and the District of Columbia have retail electricity competition. No 
state has chosen to move to a system of retail choice in recent years, while a number of states 
have taken action to restrict the effects of retail electricity competition. Status of Electricity 
Restructuring by State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/ 
page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2012). 
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generation.193 Energy regulators could require a pre-approval not only prior 
to constructing new utility-owned generation, but also to prior to entering 
into major wholesale power purchase agreements.194  
Adding GHG regulatory policies to some participants in regional 
wholesale markets but not others may result in some price distortion.195 But 
as Joel Eisen has argued, because the U.S. electricity system is still only 
partially deregulated and therefore distorted anyway, there may still be a 
role for environmental concerns in state utility policymaking.196  
Proponents of full retail deregulation may claim that state energy regu-
lators that implement GHG policies will simply prolong the country’s 
flawed regulation of electricity markets. Concerns about path dependency 
could always be raised if one is seeking to make marginal improvements to 
flawed systems of regulations. It is hard to isolate the entrenching effect 
caused by any single amendment to an existing regulatory system. Making 
improvements to an imperfect system is often more important and achieva-
ble than waiting for the unlikely possibility that the entire regulatory 
system is thrown out.  
4. Ignoring Existing Facilities 
GHG policies that focus exclusively on new plants may give utilities 
the perverse incentive to extend the life of older plants rather than build 
new plants.197 However, this concern may be less problematic in this partic-
ular instance because other EPA regulations unrelated to climate change 
will likely drive the retirement of a number of older coal-fired units, the 
largest emitters of GHGs.198  
Moreover, considering GHGs in decisions about new power plant con-
struction is vitally important to long-term climate mitigation. Plants are 
often extremely large, expensive, and have lives of forty years or more. 
                                                                                                                      
 193. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.6s (2009); J. PETER LARK, MICH. PUB. SERV. 
COMM’N, MICHIGAN’S 21ST CENTURY ELECTRIC ENERGY PLAN 15–17 (2007), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mpsc/21stcenturyenergyplan_185274_7.pdf.  
 194. Requiring a GHG adder to be considered prior to signing a major PPA should not 
violate the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction over the regula-
tion of wholesale electricity sales. See infra text accompanying notes 201–211. 
 195. The degree of distortion caused by state GHG policies is an empirical question. 
For example, if natural gas prices remain low in the short-term, a GHG policy may have 
little distorting effect, but simply bolster the decision to select a technology that is lower 
cost without considering GHG externalities. This does not mean that GHG adder policies 
do not have any real value. Fuel prices can change rapidly. If natural gas prices spike up, 
GHG adder policies may continue to make natural gas fired plants preferable to coal plants.  
 196. Joel Eisen, The Environmental Responsibility of the Regionalizing Electric Utility 
Industry, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 295, 307–08 (2005). 
 197. Black & Pierce, supra note 60, at 1402. 
 198. See supra text accompanying note 195. 
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Regulating GHGs from new construction only also has the effect of phas-
ing in the costs of GHG reductions, which means GHG regulations will 
not cause a large shock to the economy.199  
5. Insufficient Integration of Externality Costs in Consumer Prices 
GHG policies that impact utility investment decisions but which do 
not impose a tax on emissions are further imperfect because the full cost of 
the regulation is not actually passed through to consumers. As such, the full 
costs of GHGs are not felt at the end-user level and consumers “will con-
sume too much power.”200  
However, incorporating GHG externalities into new investment deci-
sions still has a comparative advantage over the status quo in terms of 
mitigating climate change. In addition, this criticism is based on an as-
sumption that electricity customers are rational actors whose consumption 
habits are sensitive to slight changes in electricity prices. This is a false 
assumption—electricity demand is notoriously price inelastic.201 Moreover, 
electricity customers face a number of structural and cognitive barriers that 
prevent them from acting as rational economic consumers.202 Accordingly, 
it is not clear whether there would be a significant impact on actual electric-
ity consumption if GHGs were incorporated into electricity prices.  
6. Leakage 
“Leakage” of GHG emissions could occur if customers move from 
suppliers subject to GHG regulations to unregulated suppliers because of 
                                                                                                                      
 199. It is also conceivable that a state or group of states that wishes to incorporate 
GHG externalities into the operation of existing plants could do so. In states whose regulat-
ed utilities do not participate in regional wholesale electricity markets, state commissions 
could order utilities to consider the price of GHG emissions when determining their dis-
patch decisions. Michael Dworkin et al., Energy Transmission and Storage, in THE LAW OF 
CLEAN ENERGY, 531, 544 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011). If a state were operating in a 
competitive regional wholesale market, an environmental dispatch could be proposed by a 
Regional Transmission Organization (RTO), subject to FERC approval. See 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824d (2006); Eisen, supra note 196, at 306. This is unlikely because it would require 
substantial agreement among a number of entities involved in RTO governance. Alterna-
tively, FERC could potentially issue a rule requiring RTOs to use environmental dispatch 
methodologies. This would be a bold administrative move that might require FERC to 
broaden the way it interprets the Federal Power Act to include environmental externalities 
in determining when rates are just and reasonable. See Grand Council of the Crees v. Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 198 F.3d 950, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 200. Black & Pierce, supra note 60, at 1403. 
 201. Anthony Paul et al., A Partial Adjustment Model of U.S. Electricity Demand by 
Region, Season, and Sector 19 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 08-50, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=20773. 
 202. Hofmeister, supra note 18, at 12–27. 
Hofmeister_Final_WEB 1/22/2013 1:51 PM 
Fall 2012] Roles for State Energy Regulators in Climate Change Mitigation 113 
price differential. In jurisdictions with traditionally regulated monopoly 
retail electricity suppliers, leakage concerns are minimized because custom-
ers are forbidden from switching to out-of-state electricity suppliers. It 
remains possible, however, that differential electricity prices will result in 
relocation to states that choose not to implement GHG policies.  
The degree of leakage is an empirical question. Relocating a firm or a 
residence requires significant transaction costs and includes a number of 
concerns wholly unrelated to electricity costs. A GHG program for new 
generation decisions is unlikely to result in dramatic increases in electricity 
prices that might drive relocations. First, the current costs of new low- or 
zero-carbon electricity is already comparable to the costs of new coal-fired 
generation.203 Moreover, even if the cost differential were significant, costs 
for new generation will often make up only a small percentage of the total 
revenue requirement of regulated utilities. Regulated utilities have signifi-
cant existing supply options, and therefore any additional incremental costs 
for less carbon intensive new generation will not likely drive large rate 
increases.  
Leakage, however, may also lead to price effects in the coal supply 
market. There is a real concern that a state GHG mitigation policy may 
reduce demand for coal, thereby reducing price, and making coal more 
attractive to states and countries that do not price the externalities of 
GHGs. It is unclear how much a reduction in U.S. demand will lower the 
international coal price. This effect reinforces the notion that ultimately a 
climate solution requires cooperation amongst a number of different coun-
tries and jurisdictions. Any effective state or national GHG regulatory 
system will add costs to the use of coal.  
7. Energy Source Substitution Effects 
Black and Pierce point out that environmental policies “raise the cost of 
utility-supplied electric power relative to other energy sources,” giving 
consumers an incentive “to switch from electric power to direct burning of 
fuel.”204 As an example, Black and Pierce suggest that consumers might 
switch to much dirtier gasoline powered appliances.205 
While this is theoretically possible, the practical impact of this switch 
from electric-powered lawn mowers, leaf-blowers, and hedge trimmers will 
likely be quite small. For the vast majority of electricity uses, there is no 
simple and easy substitute that is powered by direct combustion.206 It is 
                                                                                                                      
 203. LEVELIZED COST, supra note 106, at 4. 
 204. Black & Pierce, supra note 60, at 1406. 
 205. Id. 
 206. SMIL, supra note 145, at 32. 
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unlikely that Americans will switch to refrigerators, televisions, computers, 
or lighting powered by direct combustion.  
In addition, this point assumes that the market for electrical consumer 
products is sensitive to fuel prices. This is an empirical question, and the 
evidence suggests that consumer purchases are not very sensitive to energy 
costs.207 Increases in electricity prices due to one new generating unit that 
may have a slightly higher price are likely to be so small that they would be 
unnoticed by most consumers. Consumers also exhibit a strong status quo 
bias against substituting new goods for goods they already own.208  
A comprehensive sector-specific climate policy could help to reduce 
unwarranted substitution effects. For example, the EPA has enacted pollu-
tion control standards for gasoline-powered lawn equipment that have 
greatly improved their environmental accountability compared to the hedge 
trimmers of the early 1990s that Black and Pierce decried as notoriously 
dirty.209 
8. Slippery Slope to Regulating Other Externalities 
One potentially powerful critique of GHG regulation by state utility 
commission is a slippery slope argument. If a state public utility commis-
sion deems the federal response to the externality of climate change to be 
insufficient, what is to stop it from deeming other forms of federal envi-
ronmental regulation insufficient? Perhaps a state might not think the 
federal government’s mercury or ground level ozone rules are sufficient to 
completely account for the social cost of these pollutants. States may, on 
this reasoning, attempt to implement environmental policies for a number 
of pollutants, duplicating federal environmental regulatory efforts. A sys-
tem of environmental regulation where every state completely revisits and 
sets slightly different standards than the federal environmental standards 
could be quite inefficient.  
This is certainly a serious potential drawback. It is not, however, ulti-
mately fatal. The ability for states to exceed federal minimum standards 
provides a good system check if the federal government is not sufficiently 
acting to mitigate environmental risks. This seems clearly to be the case in 
climate change, which may be the single greatest unaccounted-for environ-
mental externality currently facing the world.210 In rare instances of federal 
                                                                                                                      
 207. Hofmeister, supra note 18, at 24–25. 
 208. Id. at 18–19. 
 209. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA420-F-08-013, EPA FINALIZES EMISSION 
STANDARDS FOR NEW NONROAD SPARK-IGNITION ENGINES, EQUIPMENT, AND VESSELS 
(2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marinesi-equipld/420f08013.pdf. 
 210. NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW 
(2007). 
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government policy failure like of this stature, a state may seek to implement 
its own regulatory program.211 Such instances are more likely to be the 
exception than the rule, however. The CAA and CWA have long provided a 
uniform national floor, not a ceiling, on environmental regulations.212 Thus, 
states have had the ability to exceed federal environmental regulations in 
the United States for decades, and this ability has not led to a crisis of 
overlapping state regulatory measures regulating air and water quality. 
State environmental policymakers might defer to the regulatory decisions 
of expert federal agencies, or they might wish not to pose additional regula-
tory compliance costs on businesses. If state policymakers have a fairly 
small disagreement about the level of environmental protection provided by 
a federal mercury rule, they may not seek to implement their own duplica-
tive regulatory overlay. The political and institutional costs of 
implementing a new regulatory scheme probably do not warrant only mar-
ginal improvements to a federal regulation.  
E. Potential Constitutional Challenges to State GHG Mitigation Policies 
1. Preemption by the Federal Power Act 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has the exclusive 
authority to set rates for wholesale electricity sales made by private utilities 
under the Federal Power Act (FPA).213 State GHG regulations that impact 
wholesale electricity rates might therefore be challenged as preempted by 
the FPA.214 Such challenges are unlikely to succeed if the state energy 
                                                                                                                      
 211. Climate change, as a globally caused problem with global effects, may provide a 
less compelling case for states to exceed federal minimums than environmental harms with 
localized impacts. But because of the magnitude of the global catastrophic risks of climate 
change, some states may seek to do what they can to mitigate and in so doing help to spur 
national climate regulations along. See text accompanying notes 154–173. 
 212. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2006). 
 213. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824, 824d, 824e (2006). The act limits jurisdiction to sales made “in 
interstate commerce.” The Supreme Court has determined, however, that there is interstate 
commerce any time that the electricity sold is connected to an interstate electric grid, which 
encompasses most wholesale transactions in the United States. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Fla. 
Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972). Wholesale transactions of electricity not part of an 
interstate electric grid occur only in limited places in the United States, such as Hawaii, 
Alaska, and parts of Texas.  
 214. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at paras. 109–110, North 
Dakota v. Swanson, No. 11-03232, 2011 WL 5223597 (D. Minn. filed Nov. 2, 2011). The 
complaint’s focus is on the outright ban on new sources of electricity that would increase 
Minnesota’s carbon dioxide emissions, but a similar argument might be made with regard to 
the GHG adder provision. The complaint also alleges that Minnesota’s GHG provisions 
frustrate the purposes of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which seeks to promote efficient 
and competitive wholesale markets, by interfering with regional transmission planning 
efforts. Id. at paras. 117–118. This argument proves too much. Any state regulation of elec-
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regulatory program is carefully designed. FERC has interpreted the FPA 
to allow states to “choose to require a utility to construct generation capaci-
ty of a preferred technology or to purchase power from the supplier of a 
particular type of resource.”215 Accordingly, a state energy regulator using 
GHG adders in a certificate of need proceeding or issuing a competitive 
bid for a specific type of generation is not likely to violate the FPA. These 
policies set a prerequisite on the type of electricity a utility can purchase; 
they are not a direct attempt to regulate wholesale prices for that electrici-
ty.216 
A state energy regulator, however, might violate FERC’s jurisdiction if 
it attempted to incorporate GHG adders to smaller wholesale market 
transactions. The regional wholesale markets use day-ahead and real-time 
markets. Regulated utilities use these markets to balance short-term supply 
and demand. These markets do not allow bidders to restrict the sources of 
electricity when determining which offers of electricity will be accepted 
based on environmental attributes.217  
To incorporate GHG externalities into short-term market transactions, 
states might include GHG adders in annual utility commission approval 
procedures for electricity supply procurement plans.218 The adder could 
then be incorporated ex ante for the average GHG emissions of the all of 
the resources of the regional wholesale market. The utility would weigh 
market transactions against other supply options such as long-term pur-
chase power agreements and the resulting plan would need regulatory 
                                                                                                                      
tricity generation has some impact on wholesale markets, and the FPA clearly intends for a 
continued state role in the regulation of utilities. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006). 
 215. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC 61,215, 61,676 (1995). FERC recently affirmed this 
authority. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 132 FERC 61,047, para. 26 (2010). 
 216. It is true that this prerequisite may change if wholesale prices change in a GHG 
adder system, but the energy regulator is still not regulating the wholesale rates with GHG 
adders. At the time of the certificate of need proceeding, there is no wholesale utility trans-
action that is being regulated by the commission. The commission is merely determining 
exactly what type of generation is prudent to meet the utility’s supply needs. In this way a 
GHG adder is analogous to a state renewable energy mandate. The state should not run 
afoul of the FPA because its chosen electricity generation selection policy is more sensitive 
to electricity prices than a flat renewable energy mandate. S. Cal. Edison Co., 70 FERC 
61,215, 61,676 (1995). 
 217. Dworkin et al., supra note 199, at 543–44. 
 218. Many states require approval of such plans. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 460.6j(4)–(7) (2009). 
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approval.219 This would be only a rough way to incorporate GHG adders 
into the price of electricity.220 
2. Preemption by the Clean Air Act 
A claim suggesting state GHG policies are preempted by the CAA 
would likely not succeed. There is no express preemption of state GHG 
adders in the statutory text. There is no direct conflict between the CAA’s 
permitting provisions and GHG policies incorporated into state energy 
regulatory procedures.221 In addition, state GHG policies are not an “obsta-
cle” to the purposes of the CAA.222 State policies would assist a primary 
purpose of the CAA’s emissions regulations, which “is to encourage or 
otherwise promote reasonable Federal, State, and local governmental ac-
tions” to prevent pollution such as GHGs.223 Implied “field” preemption 
requires a clear inference of legislative intent to preempt state law, reflect-
ing the importance of state sovereignty.224 This intent is not clearly 
exhibited by the CAA, which includes a very broad savings clause that 
explicitly provides that state air pollution standards that are stricter than 
the federal minimums are not preempted by the act.225  
                                                                                                                      
 219. If the utility’s actual use of market transactions differed from this approved plan, 
it is conceivable (though perhaps practically unlikely) that an energy regulator would disal-
low rate recovery for excessive use of market transactions.  
 220. The inability to easily incorporate GHG adders into short-term market procure-
ment decisions is problematic. If GHG adders are not added to these small market 
transactions, this might be make these transactions less costly and encourage cost-
minimizing utilities to make more use of small market transactions. However, the utility’s 
own incentives to build new construction itself in a regulated system acts to counteract this 
dynamic. Utilities in regulated systems generally earn a rate of return on capital investments 
they make, but do not earn a rate of return on long-term power purchase agreements or 
short-term market transactions. PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 61, at 94–98. Accordingly, 
when faced with the choice of whether to build or buy, a utility acting in the interests of its 
shareholders will generally choose to build. 
 221. Cf. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (invalidating state law that 
conflicts with federal law). 
 222. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (overturning law that presents an 
“obstacle” to the “accomplishment and execution” of federal law). 
 223. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) (2006). To the extent that a subsidiary purpose of the CAA is 
to achieve this pollution prevention in a cost-effective manner, adders effectively serve this 
purpose as well. One could argue, however, that the duplicative nature of the dual regulatory 
schemes is not cost effective. 
 224. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011). 
 225. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006). The Supreme Court has also held that while compre-
hensive federal regulation of nuclear energy preempts all state nuclear safety regulation, it 
does not preempt the states from regulating the economic aspects of nuclear power, such as 
refusing to grant a certificate of need for a new nuclear power plant on the ground that it 
was not economically viable. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & 
Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). State GHG policies which influence generation options 
may be likewise defended as economic risk mitigation measures.  
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In the summer of 2011, the Supreme Court decided American Electric 
Power Co. v. Connecticut, holding that the CAA’s emerging GHG regula-
tions displaced potential federal common law actions claiming GHG 
emissions created a public nuisance.226 The standard for displacement the 
court employed was “whether the field has been occupied,” which sounds 
quite similar to the test for so-called “field preemption” of state laws by 
federal statutes.227 However, the analysis for displacement of federal com-
mon law by a federal statute is distinct from the analysis of preemption of 
state law by federal law under the Supremacy Clause.228 Respect for the 
sovereignty of individual states in the federal system leads courts to apply a 
general presumption against preemption.229 
In the analogous context of the CWA, the Supreme Court has held that 
while federal common law actions were displaced, state common law actions 
were not preempted.230 The Court held, however, that state common law 
nuisance claims are preempted if they attempt to address sources outside of 
the state’s borders.231 This might prove to be a problematic precedent for 
states wishing to apply GHG policies to sources outside of the state’s bor-
ders.232 GHG policies are distinguishable from nuisance claims, however, 
because nuisance law includes the possibility of injunctive relief. Unlike 
injunctions issued under state nuisance law, a GHG policy would not nec-
essarily directly intrude on the activities of an out-of-state electricity 
provider. Rather, adders would only impact the ability of in-state consum-
ers to purchase electricity from particular sources. While it may reduce 
demand for the product of an out-of-state electricity producer, a GHG 
mitigation policy would not lead to the complex and costly maze of differ-
ing injunctive standards that the Supreme Court feared might exist if 
various state nuisance laws could all be applied to the same pollution 
source.233 Because of the interstate nature of wholesale electricity markets, a 
state cannot effectively mitigate GHG emissions attributable to its electric-
ity consumption unless the state is able to limit its imports of GHG-
intensive electricity. If the CAA’s savings clause has any meaning as applied 
                                                                                                                      
 226. 131 S. Ct. at 2537. 
 227. Id. at 2538. 
 228. Id. at 2540 (declining to rule on whether state nuisance law claims were preempt-
ed by the CAA). 
 229. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 230. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 353 (1981); Int’l Paper Co. v. Oulette, 479 
U.S. 481 (1987). 
 231. Int’l Paper, 479 U.S. at 497. 
 232. The Fourth Circuit recently relied on this precedent to find that state nuisance 
laws which resulted in injunctions requiring pollution scrubbers to be applied to an out-of-
state power plant were preempted by the CAA. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. 
Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 309 (2010). 
 233. Int’l Paper, 479 U.S. at 496–97.  
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to state GHG mitigation efforts, it should be applied to allow states to 
mitigate GHGs from the state’s consumption, not merely from pollution 
sources within the state’s borders.  
3. Dormant Commerce Clause  
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to prohibit 
states from discriminating against out-of-state providers of goods or ser-
vices.234 State laws that facially discriminate against out-of-state producers 
face a form of strict scrutiny and are almost always found invalid under this 
so-called “dormant” aspect of the Commerce Clause.235 Therefore, a state 
energy regulatory requirement that forced utilities to purchase electricity or 
fuel only from within that state may violate the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.236 Strict scrutiny can also apply to a facially neutral statute if it is 
enacted with a clear legislative purpose to discriminate against out-of-state 
producers.237 To avoid strict scrutiny, states should not use the details of 
GHG adders as a thinly veiled protectionist tool that favors in-state gener-
ation.238 
Additionally, facially neutral state statutes that have a discriminatory 
effect on out-of-state commerce may violate the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. To determine when facially neutral statutes cross the constitutional 
line, the Supreme Court has used a balancing test: 
                                                                                                                      
 234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3; Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 472 (2005). 
 235. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476. A discriminatory statute might be found valid if it 
“advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondis-
criminatory alternatives,” but this is a very high bar. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 
269, 278 (1988). A federal statute can also explicitly authorize states to discriminate against 
out-of-state producers. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 457–58 (1992). There do 
not appear to be any federal statutes that generally authorize discriminatory treatment of 
electricity providers by state energy regulators, however. New Eng. Power Co. v. New 
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 340–41 (1982) (holding that the FPA’s savings clause allowing 
state regulation of retail electricity rates did not authorize violations of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause). If a state energy regulator were implementing adders pursuant to authority 
granted by the CAA, this might be explicitly allowed by federal statute. 
 236. Wyoming, 502 U.S. 437 (holding that an Oklahoma statute requiring coal-fired 
power plants in the state to use Oklahoma coal for at least 10% of their fuel supply violated 
the Dormant Commerce Clause). 
 237. Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).  
 238. Whether an adder is intentionally designed by a state to discriminate against out-
of-state producers will be a factual question determined in each circumstance. But it seems 
fairly likely that most adder schemes will not have such discriminatory purposes aimed at 
out-of-state interests. But see Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 
1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Order on NPRA Plaintiff’s Summary Adjudication Motion) (finding 
that a California Low Carbon Fuel Standard that used nominally neutral criteria to reduce 
GHG emissions from transportation fuels consumed in California was actually designed to 
impermissibly favor California fuel producers over out-of-state producers and was therefore 
facially discriminatory). 
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Where [a] statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce 
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on 
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question 
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be 
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest 
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser 
impact on interstate activities.239 
In general, the balancing test is very deferential to neutral state stat-
utes, since almost any market regulation could conceivably result in some 
sort of discriminatory effect on an out-of-state producer.240 A state has a 
number of potentially valid local interests in limiting GHG emissions 
resulting from electricity sold within its borders. A state may view its 
GHG policy as a small piece of a bottom-up global solution to mitigating 
the effects of climate change, which may have a variety of adverse effects in 
that state.241 A state GHG policy may be a manner of fairly accounting for 
the true cost of an externality caused by consumption within its borders. A 
state may also consider adders as a prudent risk management measure for 
protecting its residents from costs imposed by future national or interna-
tional climate regulations or taxes. All of these rationales are justifiable 
local interests.  
Opponents of adders may try to claim that addressing global climate 
change is not a valid “local” interest.242 This argument is ultimately not 
likely to be persuasive.243 Respect for state sovereignty should counsel 
federal courts to defer to state governments regarding what constitutes a 
“local” interest. If a state wants to pursue a goal it cannot achieve without 
the cooperation of other states and countries, that decision should be re-
                                                                                                                      
 239. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citations omitted). 
 240. Robert Sedler, The Constitution and the American Federal System, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 
1487, 1496–1506 (2009); United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. O’Neida Herkimer Solid Waste 
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 347 (2007) (noting that applying strict scrutiny to a state’s 
police power authority harkened back to Lochnerian jurisprudence and warning against this 
“judicial supremacy”). 
 241. In Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, the Supreme Court recognized in its stand-
ing analysis that a state may have a valid interest in reducing the risk of rising sea levels and 
other climate change impacts. 549 U.S. 1438, 1455–56 (2009). 
 242. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 09-02234), 2010 
WL 5882459. 
 243. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1093 
(E.D. Cal. 2011) (Order on NPRA Plaintiff’s Summary Adjudication Motion) (finding that 
addressing global climate change is a valid local purpose under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis). 
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spected and not discounted as a “non-local” interest.244 The thrust of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause balancing test comes in the balancing between 
the state’s interest and the effect on commerce. The test should not be read 
to foreclose the validity of state interests prior to that balancing. 
State GHG policies may be portrayed as ineffective measures to 
achieve the state’s local interest, however.245 No single state’s adder pro-
gram will completely mitigate the risk of climate change. Therefore, the 
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce might arguably outweigh the 
state’s interest in maintaining the regulation. A reviewing court may look 
for alternative, less discriminatory means to address the issue. In the case of 
GHG mitigation, GHG adders are generally a neutral and fair means to 
reduce GHG emissions, but they are by no means perfect. A national or 
international price on carbon would be more efficient than a state adder 
policy, but that policy is beyond the state’s control.  
The Supreme Court recently noted that courts should be “particularly 
hesitant” to use the Dormant Commerce Clause to strike down regulation 
that is traditionally deemed to be a local function.246 The regulation of 
electricity generation choices by public utilities has traditionally been a 
state matter.247  
In addition, the Supreme Court recently noted that when “the most 
palpable harm imposed by the ordinances” is an increase in price for the 
services born by the citizens of the jurisdiction enacting the regulation, 
intervention by courts through the Dormant Commerce Clause is less 
justified.248 To the extent that GHG adders increase prices for electricity, 
those price increases will be primarily felt by the consumers in the state 
using the adders. If that is the outcome chosen by the political process in 
that state, there should be, as the Supreme Court suggests, “no reason to 
step in.”249 
                                                                                                                      
 244. As the Supreme Court noted in Massachusetts v. EPA, just because a state’s interest 
addressing climate change is “widely shared” should not minimize it as an interest. 549 U.S. 
at 522 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)). 
 245. The plaintiffs challenging the Minnesota statute tried to argue that the law would 
not effectively achieve its objectives, characterizing the statute as “at best, a purely symbolic 
gesture” which “will not have any meaningful effect on global warming.” Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at para. 58, North Dakota v. Swanson, No. 11-03232, 2011 
WL 5223597 (D. Minn. filed Nov. 2, 2011). 
 246. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. O’Neida Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 
U.S. 330, 344 (2007) (rejecting a challenge to a law regulating the traditionally local func-
tion of trash collection). 
 247. Davies, supra note 1, at 494–95. 
 248. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc., 550 U.S. at 345. 
 249. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The significant risk of global climate change demands proactive mitiga-
tion measures. The pervasive nature of the various sources of GHGs 
throughout various sectors of the world economy demands an all-hands-on-
deck approach to mitigation, particularly as the world struggles to reach 
consensus on broad international mitigation agreements. In the next dec-
ade, the United States will likely invest significantly in new electric gener-
generating capacity. GHG risks should be thoughtfully considered in these 
investment decisions. In the United States, state energy regulators are well 
positioned to assist in this consideration—either by requiring regulated 
utilities to implement GHG adders or by assisting state environmental 
regulators in the CAA permitting process. States might also consider a 
more dramatic role for their energy regulators—direct affirmative selection 
of energy generating technologies. All of these roles for state energy regula-
tors have drawbacks, and they may be subject to potential constitutional 
challenges. But given the need to build new, long-term power plants, the 
nature of the threat of climate change, and the insufficiency of the world’s 
and the United States’ response to date, the time has come for energy regu-
lators to become more involved in climate change mitigation efforts. 
